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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

ENDOWMENTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX POLICY:
WEALTH EROSION FROM A LOSS IN CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
The most significant tax overhaul bill in over thirty years was enacted in 2017 and expected to
have wide-ranging effects. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act includes numerous policies that directly
and indirectly impact the higher education sector and the effect to endowments was not addressed
in the public debate leading up to enactment. Unlike expendable gifts, a reduction in endowment
contributions has a cumulative effect because a gift to an endowment can benefit all subsequent
years. Each year following a contribution, investment income earned on the original gift is
available for spending and benefits escalate over time in amount, assuming the value of the
original gift continues to grow. The purpose of this study is to analyze precisely the direct and
indirect impact of personal income tax regulations on the charitable sector. It will do so by
disaggregating data to delineate clearly the differential consequences that distinguish higher
education from other components of the broad charitable sector umbrella. A model is developed
to predict the erosion of endowment wealth following a decrease in contributions due to tax
policy using panel data from a previous ten-year period assuming the tax policy was first
effective beginning in year one. The erosion of overall endowment wealth is gradual, and
subsectors of higher education are predicted to experience varying rates of attrition. Regression
analysis is then used on giving by source data to institutional and endowment characteristics
indicative of greater reliance on contributions from individuals to the endowment; the results are
suggestive but inconclusive.
Keywords: Endowment, Higher Education Finance, Higher Education Economics, Charitable
Contributions, Tax Policy
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Universities and the higher education environment are evolving rapidly with
exponential growth in student enrollments and demand for services while enduring
decreasing state appropriations and federal support. Frequent tuition hikes reflect higher
costs and test the financial limits of most families even as educational institutions
routinely seek private gifts to supplement resource inflows. At the same time that the
nation has increased angst about the cost of higher education, the media regularly report
the growing levels of wealth of many prominent universities and colleges. After nine
successive years of growth, contributions to U.S. colleges and universities reached
$46.73 billion in 2018 and seven institutions reported single gifts over $100 million
(Council for Advancement and Support of Education [CASE], 2019a). At the end of
2018, what is believed to be the largest single private donation to higher education was
recorded to an endowment. Johns Hopkins University announced a $1.8 billion
endowment gift for need-based scholarships from businessman and former New York
City mayor Michael Bloomberg (Hartocollis, 2018). Not all universities are so fortunate.
A loss in contributions would alter the already-strained financial operations of higher
education institutions. Erosion of endowment wealth requires special consideration.
This study examines the long-run financial impact, identified as wealth erosion, of
a sustained loss in contributions to the endowment base. While the research context is
within a change in tax policy for individuals, other events could be the catalyst for a
sustained loss in giving. To extend the tax policy context, I consider institutional
characteristics that may reflect higher education endowments with greater reliance on
giving from individuals to build and maintain endowment wealth. Those institutions have
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a more urgent need to evaluate the impact of the most recent change in individual tax
deductions of charitable contributions which are predicted to decline.
Endowments of Higher Education Institutions
Endowments garner a great deal of attention, both positive and negative, for
higher education institutions – not only as a metric to determine rank and education
quality but also due to political fury over hoarding wealth. The current endowment
environment features highly publicized mega-gifts and market values in the millions and
billions. The most extensive annual report of higher education endowments is the Study
of Endowments published by the National Association of College and University
Business Officers (NACUBO). The annual reports have been published since 1991,
jointly with the Commonfund Institute from 2009 until 2017 and with Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association of America (TIAA) in 2018 (NACUBO, 2019b). The 2018
NACUBO-TIAA Study of Endowments (NTSE) surveyed 802 U.S. colleges,
universities, and affiliated foundations that, together, reported over $616.5 billion in
endowment assets. Approximately 13% of the respondents had over $1 billion
endowments (accounting for 77% of all university endowment assets) and only 9.1% had
endowments less than $25 million (NACUBO, 2019a). In a separate study, Moody’s
(2015) reported the ten wealthiest education institutions held nearly one-third of the total
wealth of the 503 organizations analyzed. The top 40 institutions held almost two-thirds
of the total wealth with median cash and investment balances of $6.3 billion (Moody’s,
2015). Universities have institutional policies to dictate acceptable risk and spending
rates and teams of investment managers to oversee daily operations of their endowments.
Uniform law seemingly exists to protect both the endowment and the original donor
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restrictions that often require income to only be used for capital projects, professorships,
or scholarships. Administrators and donors want to grow and preserve endowment funds.
Politicians and tuition payers want those funds to off-set the rising cost of an education.
The diversity of interested parties makes for a complex environment.
Endowment defined.
Permanently restricted donations are legally defined as gifts the donor requires to
be maintained in perpetuity but allows the earnings from the original gift to be used by
the charitable organization. Permanent restrictions, in theory, never expire and most are
in the form of endowments. A patron may donate a large sum of cash and investments
with the caveat that the gift be invested indefinitely and permits the nonprofit to expend
only the earnings from the investment corpus. The earnings are considered temporarily
restricted if the patron has designated either how or when those earnings are to be used.
With a strong economy, permanent endowments are desirable for the revenue stream
produced. When the economy weakens, the revenue streams from permanent
endowments diminish and the corpus is unavailable to supplement the shortfall. Donor
restrictions are central in any discussion related to endowments.
Endowment categories are determined by the existence and extent of donor
restrictions. “True” endowments are well understood to be invested funds donated to a
charity which cannot be expended but produce an income stream to benefit the charitable
organization. Even with this recognized technical definition, the term is used rather
loosely in higher education. In today’s university, “true” endowment funds are
commingled with donations that have a finite investment restriction (term endowments)
and funds the university chooses, but are not required, to treat as an endowment (quasi-
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endowments). Statutory law defines endowment funds as “an institutional fund or part of
an institutional fund that is not wholly expendable by the institution on a current basis”
(Uniform Law Commission, n.d., p. 7), which excludes quasi-endowments. The quasiendowment requires only board or management action to expend the funds since there is
no donor restriction dictating use of the funds. Accounting standards and legal statutes
distinguish the three categories of endowments but other environments, especially within
the higher education sector, do not. The popular press, often using the NACUBO
endowment studies as a source, and most public discussions refer to “endowments” as
inclusive of true, term, and quasi-endowment funds.
Endowment and university finances.
The endowment environment of today is not representative of the past, nor is it a
fruition of what was once expected. American universities, on average, had 25% of
income generated by their endowment in the early 1900s (Kimball & Johnson, 2012b).
In this same era, the General Education Board (GEB) published a recommendation that
universities should strive to have endowments cover 40% to 60% of university
expenditures (as cited in Kimball & Johnson, 2012b, p. 13). The reality is universities
report endowments fund, on average, 10% of operating costs (NACUBO, 2019a) – a far
cry from the 25% average and GEB’s 60% goal of the early 1900s. The 802 U.S. colleges
and universities participating in the most recent NTSE reported spending more than $21.6
billion supporting university operations (NACUBO, 2019a). On average, 49% of the
distributions from endowments was spent on student scholarship and other financial aid
programs and 16% supported academic tutoring and other related functions (NACUBO,
2019a).
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Historically, endowments provided steady streams of cash income generated from
only the safest investments. Legal definitions of fiduciary responsibility became less
restrictive to enable endowments’ fuller participation in financial markets. Investment
strategies became more aggressive, distribution policies became more conservative, and
the effort and energy devoted to growing the endowment multiplied. In one century’s
time, universities moved from what is best for the institution to what is best for the
endowment. Many variables factor into determining the level of support provided by the
endowment stream including market performance and expenditure decisions. While the
basic expectation of providing support has not changed, the manner in how it is
accomplished has morphed in transformative ways. Two elements that influence the
mode in which the income supports the university are investment strategy and
distribution policy.
Investment strategy.
The role of investment strategy on endowments should not be underestimated.
The strategy serves as the roadmap for the university to create wealth and generate
income by outlining how assets will be allocated to various investment risk categories.
More than just following the tide of all investors, current endowments have the size and
prestige to be influencers and less-wealthy endowments are mimicking the large and
high-profile university endowments. The investment strategies employed by universities
evolved slowly but significantly over more than a century, from maximizing income to
maximizing growth.
At the end of the nineteenth century endowments were invested in “safe”
securities such as bonds, real estate, and mortgages with an aim to maximize spendable
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income. During his tenure as Harvard’s president from 1869 to 1909, Charles Eliot
proclaimed and published his university strategy for wealth that largely hinged on
endowments. Kimball and Johnson (2012a) researched Eliot’s written correspondence of
both letters and annual reports that documented his “free money” strategy. Eliot’s stance
was that wealth determined rank in the competition between universities and wealth was
defined by the endowment. He advocated for unrestricted gifts to the endowment –
unrestricted in both how the funds could be invested and how the funds could be spent
(thus, “free money”). By the 1920s Eliot’s strategy was the normal mode of operation and
Harvard and Yale had initiated mass fundraising to build endowments (Kimball, 2015;
Kimball & Johnson, 2012a).
As endowment funds increased, institutions started adding high-yield corporate
stock to their portfolios (Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, 2011). The stock
market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed changed the investing
landscape. Throughout the 1930s endowment portfolios increased holdings in common
stock, either by design or by accident as fixed-income instruments lost value or went into
default (Goetzmann, Griswold, & Tseng, 2010). Goetzmann et al. (2010) attributed
empirical work performed in the 1920s as the cause for a subsequent shift away from the
“preservation of capital and avoidance of risk” investment strategy to a new focus on the
equity premium. By the mid-1930s portfolios were about 16% invested in common stock
and by 1940 many endowment portfolios exceeded 45% investment in equities (Center
for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, 2011; Goetzmann et al., 2010). The endowments
and the economy recovered and continued to grow. Along with a new 60/40 target mix
(60% equities and 40% bonds) in the 1960s, endowment portfolios not only increased
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investment in equities but also moved away from dividend stock and into growth stock
(Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute, 2011). The dawn of the “maximize
growth” investment strategy had arrived.
The 1970s mark a pivotal shift in the endowment environment. The economy
experienced “stagnation and rapid inflation” and universities were facing an “impending
decline in the number of eighteen-year-olds” (Kimball, 2014, p. 895). Not until this era
were equities considered more stable than bonds (Fishman, 2014). Universities began a
new trend of achieving endowment growth through investment instead of fundraising and
“total return investing” came onto the scene (Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus
Institute, 2011). Total return investing redefined the spendable investment income to
include unrealized capital gains and called for greater diversification (Fishman, 2014).
External investment managers were now heavily used by the universities to manage the
endowments. These investment professionals introduced Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT)
to the endowments while also increasing the risk tolerance of endowment managers
(Fishman, 2014). MPT correlates risk and return, theorizes greater risk brings greater
return, and manages risk by diversifying investments (Center for Social Philanthropy
Tellus Institute, 2011). Diversification was achieved by moving into international equities
and alternative investments (Fishman, 2014).
MPT applied to endowment management became known as the “Endowment
Model of Investing” and most of the larger endowments soon adopted the new strategy to
emulate the high returns garnered by Yale and Harvard (Center for Social Philanthropy
Tellus Institute, 2011; Fishman, 2014). The Endowment Model of Investing relies on
diversification into nontraditional, illiquid securities (alternative investments) aimed at
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producing excess returns independent of underlying market actions (Fishman, 2014). The
securities traded, and strategies employed, were not well understood or regulated. The
1990’s market rewarded the universities that had adopted the Endowment Model of
Investing with unprecedented returns (Ehrenberg, 2002). The tech bubble burst in 2000
but industry leaders Harvard and Yale had limited exposure to the domestic market and
no significant change to the investment strategy resulted (Center for Social Philanthropy
Tellus Institute, 2011). However, the financial crisis of 2008 that led to the Great
Recession created multiple problems for institutions reliant on their endowments.
Endowment values declined and portfolios lacked liquidity, resulting in difficulty in
meeting collateral and investment obligations to hedge funds and private equity partners
(Fishman, 2014). The average university endowment lost more than 24% of market value
in 2008 and many large endowments continued to report double-digit losses in 2009
(Goetzmann et al., 2010). Capital was not available to seize new investment opportunities
and alternatives could not be unloaded (Fishman, 2014). Fishman (2014) blamed the
endowment catastrophe during the Great Recession on the “underappreciation of risk and
the overconfidence in the ability to manage it” by universities and their endowment
managers (p. 233).
Despite the devastating results of the last decade, the Endowment Model of
Investing continues to be employed into fiscal year 2018. According to the 2018 NTSE,
average asset allocations continued to strongly favor alternative investments (52%) and
equities (36%) with the remaining 12% in fixed-income securities (8%) and liquid
securities (4%) including cash (NACUBO, 2019a). However, these averages related
primarily to the largest institutions where the average investment in alternatives was 58%
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(NACUBO, 2019a). Smaller institutions were investing in lower risk models averaging
only 11% in alternatives (NACUBO, 2019a). While the risk remains, the rewards
continue to be volatile; universities’ average return for 2018 was 8.2% after a rebound to
12.2% in 2017 from a negative 1.9% in 2016 (NACUBO, 2019b). Following two years of
strong returns, the ten-year average was 5.8% by 2018 as compared to the average longterm return objective of 7.2% reported by universities (NACUBO, 2019a). The
investment strategy employed determines the level and type of return generated which
can (or cannot) be spent for university purposes.
Distribution policy.
The expectation of endowments has always been, and continues to be, to provide
financial support to the university. The investment strategy balances risk and return in
order to protect the longevity of the endowment, but fund disbursement must also be
factored into the long-range objectives. Universities typically establish a formal policy,
known as the spending rule, that states a formula for calculating annual distributions from
the endowment. Spending rules attempt to provide appropriate disbursement levels from
the endowment while protecting the corpus from deterioration. The spending rule will
also specify a spending rate to be used – the specific percentage applied to the
endowment value to convert into a dollar distribution. As noted in the 2018 NTSE, “In
order to maintain the inflation-adjusted value of the endowment over long periods of
time, spending should not exceed the endowment’s nominal returns less experienced
inflation.” (NACUBO, 2019a, p.24). Brown and Tiu (2013) identified seven categories of
spending rules employed by university endowments:
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1. Decide on an Appropriate Rate Annually: Determines the spending rate deemed
appropriate on a yearly basis.
2. Increase Prior Year's Spending by a Percentage: Adjusts spending upwards
each year, using either a simple formula or one based on the inflation rate.
3. Spend a Percentage of a Moving Average of Market Values: Determines annual
payout as a percentage of an average of beginning-of-period market values over a
pre-specified series of past periods.
4. Spend a Percentage of Current Yield: Spend a percentage of current income
generated during the investment period.
5. Spend a Percentage of Assets Under Management (AUM): Determines annual
payout as a percentage of the beginning-of-period fund assets for the current
period.
6. Hybrid Rules: Uses a simple formula to combine two or more different payout
categories into a single spending rule.
7. Other Payout Rules: Uses a formula or approach that differs from those listed
above or did not provide a complete set of information. (p. 9)
Consistent over the previous decade, the 2018 NTSE found 75% of university
endowments used the percentage of a moving average of market value spending rate
while another 20% used a hybrid rule that included the moving average approach
(NACUBO, 2019a). Market value can greatly vary from the beginning of one fiscal year
to the next, therefore a rolling average calculation (based on multiple years of quarterly
or annual market values) is now a common element of the payout formula to avoid
extreme distribution variations period to period.
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Market values fluctuate and can cause the effective spending rate (distribution
amount as a percentage of the endowment fair market value at the beginning of the fiscal
year) to vary from the stated policy payout rate. The NTSE study indicates average
effective payout rates only slightly varied in the last ten years but were on a downward
trend from the previous decade. The average effective rate was 4.4% in 2018 compared to
a range of 4.2% and 4.6% since 2009 (NACUBO, 2019b). Since 2001 the peak average
effective rate was 5.1% in 2003 (NACUBO, 2008; NACUBO, 2019b). Public institutions
averaged lower effective spending rates than private colleges and universities over the
last two decades and higher dollar-value endowments tended to average higher effective
spending rates, although the last few years has noted exceptions (NACUBO, 2008;
NACUBO, 2019b).
Summary.
The wealth managed through university endowments is significant and more
complex than a typical corporate investment fund. Commingling of possibly thousands of
funds with various donor restrictions on how and when funds should be disbursed, and
the expectation of indefinite life, add to normal allocation-of-risk deliberation.
Investment strategy created from this environment, the Endowment Model of Investing,
heavily relies on equities and high risk, illiquid alternative investment. Return is
generated by increased value, not cash dividends or interest income, blurring the
distinction between what can and cannot be spent. Spending policies attempt to balance
the need to protect the endowment purchasing power and the responsibility to support
university operations with distributions.
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Historical Review of Tax Policy
To encourage the public services provided by charitable entities and supported by
donors, the government subsidizes the nonprofit sector activities by incentivizing giving
through charitable contribution deductions for donors. The tax deduction reduces the cost
of giving by decreasing personal taxable income equal to the value of the contribution.
Donors in higher tax brackets receive greater benefits as they are taxed at higher rates. If
a donor is in the 35 percent tax bracket, each dollar of contribution and deduction results
in a lower tax obligation by 35 cents. In simplest form, the price of giving each dollar is 1
– t where t is the marginal tax rate, or in the case of the example, 65 cents. For donors in
the 25 percent tax bracket, the price of contributing is 75 cents per dollar donated.
Additional tax benefits are realized for gifts of appreciated property by avoiding capital
gains tax. A taxpayer that sells investments, for example, with a cost basis lower than fair
value would be subject to a capital gains tax on the difference. If the taxpayer instead
donates the investment to a charitable organization, no capital tax is owed and the
charitable contribution deduction is equal to the fair value of the donated asset.
The deduction continues to be of interest to Congress during fiscally stressed
times as it diverts significant revenues from the government coffers. The Joint Committee
on Taxation (2018) estimated $58 billion of federal tax revenue is forgone from
charitable contribution deductions annually including approximately $10.1 billion from
charitable contribution deductions to educational institutions. Giving USA reported
contributions to colleges and universities are estimated to be two-thirds of the education
category (as cited in Bellfleur, 2010, p. 18). The deduction also greatly matters to higher
education administrators for the long-held belief that the tax deduction stimulates giving
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and contributions are of significant importance to these institutions. A brief review of
significant tax policies related to charitable contributions follows.
War Income Tax Revenue Act of 1917 and Individual Income Tax Act of
1944.
The personal income tax was created with the Revenue Act of 1913 and the
charitable contribution deduction followed shortly after with the War Income Tax
Revenue Act of 1917 (Rosenberg, Steurele, Ovalle, & Stallworth, 2016). The charitable
deduction was intended to motivate charitable giving and to define the personal tax base
as net of donations (Rosenberg et al., 2016). Charitable deductions are only allowable if
the contribution is made to a qualifying charity. The War Income Tax Revenue Act of
1917 provided the first statutory language to define the permissible organizations as those
“operating exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational purposes, or to
societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals” (as cited in Smith, 2016, p.
7). Since then, literary organizations and those that foster national or international
amateur sports competition were added to the list of qualifying charities (Smith, 2016).
The definition of qualifying organizations has stood the test of time, but much else about
charitable deductions continued to change.
In 1939 only 5% of the population paid income taxes but in less than a decade it
grew to encompassing close to 65% of the population, creating concerns about
administration of and compliance with personal income taxes (Smith, 2016). The
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 introduced the concept of the standard deduction to
simplify tax calculations (Smith, 2016). Election of the standard deduction eliminates the
requirement to track and calculate expenses eligible for an itemized deduction. In
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addition, the charitable deduction limitation, previously 15% of taxable income, was
changed to 15% of adjusted gross income (Lindsey, 2002). The latter provision of the
Individual Income Tax Act of 1944 increased the allowable charitable deduction as
adjusted gross income could be higher than taxable income. The former provision
reduced the number of taxpayers that benefited from the charitable deduction because the
standard deduction commonly exceeded the available itemized deductions for low- and
middle-class households.
Tax Reform Act of 1969.
Tax reform in the 1950s and early 1960s made modest adjustments to the
charitable contribution deduction, primarily by increasing the limitation as a percent of
adjusted gross income. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 increased the deduction limitation to
50% for qualifying charities and 20% for certain other charities, now recognized as
private foundations. Establishment of private foundations in the United States was
stimulated by massive fortunes generated from the Industrial Revolution (Thelin &
Trollinger, 2014). The wealthy initially moved into the philanthropic arena either out of a
feeling of responsibility or a need to improve image. By the 1950s the tax structure
motivated the wealthy to use foundations as a tax shelter. Congress, aware of numerous
cases of the wealthy receiving tax benefits without subsequently engaging in
philanthropy, passed the Tax Reform Act of 1969 in part to combat the abuse (Marsh,
2002). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 established a minimum distribution requirement and
an excise tax on net investment income for private foundations and limited the tax
benefits of donating appreciated property to all charity types (Lindsey, 2002; Waleson,
n.d.).
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Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Congress made a historic move with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 by
creating a non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction. The provision was a pilot
project intended to combat the reduction in charitable contributions and government
services experienced throughout the 1970s (Smith, 2016). For five years donors that
elected the standard deduction were also eligible to claim charitable contribution
deductions, normally mutually exclusive options. The non-itemizer deduction was phased
in over the five years from 1982 with both a percentage and dollar of donation limitation,
25% per dollar of donation up to $100, until full deductibility with no cap in 1986
(Lindsey, 2002). As noted by Smith (2016), “1986 now stands as an anomaly in the tax
laws as the only year since the standard deduction was introduced, in which nonitemizers could fully deduct their charitable contributions” (p. 19). Subsequent research
has considered the tax price elasticity of giving for non-itemizers using this single year.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 is noteworthy for what it did not enact as much as
what it did enact. The non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction created by the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 was slated to sunset in 1986 and was not extended
with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, even though the provision survived the House and was
heavily debated in the Senate (Smith, 2016). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also increased
the standard deduction and reduced marginal tax rates, increasing the tax price of giving
for most taxpayers (Clotfelter, 1990).
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) was signed into law in December
2017 (U.S. House, 2017). Very few provisions of the TCJA directly addressed charitable
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contribution deductions. Cash donations to public charities, previously limited to 50%,
increased to 60% of the taxpayers adjusted gross income (Nevius, 2018). Seating rights
for collegiate athletic events, previously considered a charitable contribution, were
excluded as a donation (Nevius, 2018). While the former increased and the latter
decreased potential tax benefits of giving, neither were expected to change the tax price
of giving as much as other TCJA provisions. Most elements of the TCJA indirectly
affected the charitable contribution benefit through changes to standard deduction
amounts, eligibility of itemized deductions, and reduction of marginal tax rates.
The TCJA reduced marginal tax rates and shifted tax bracket income ranges
which, in isolation, increased the tax price of giving for a taxpayer. The top marginal rate
under the TCJA is 37%, decreased from 39.6%, increasing the tax price of giving for
each dollar from 60.4 to 63 cents. Single taxpayers with $100,000 of taxable income have
a marginal rate of 24% under TCJA and, if itemizing, a 76-cent tax price for each dollar
given. In the year prior to TCJA, the tax price was 72 cents reflecting the marginal tax
rate of 28%. For high-income filers the repeal of the Pease limitation on itemized
deductions and the alternative minimum tax exemption increase potentially results in
lower marginal tax rates and higher tax prices of giving (Michel, 2017). Due to the
shifting of the tax bracket ranges, a few income bands have a higher top marginal tax rate
under TCJA, but the majority of filers either have a decrease or no change to their top
marginal rate.
The increase in the standard deduction also increased the tax price of giving for
many filers. By nearly doubling the standard deduction, a significant number of taxpayers
stopped itemizing deductions and opted for the simpler tax return preparation method.
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Changes to allowed itemized deductions also increased the number of filers electing the
standard deduction. Deductions for unreimbursed employee expenses, tax preparation
fees, hobby expenses, investment fees, and other miscellaneous deductions subject to a
2% floor were eliminated under the TCJA (Bonner, 2019). State and local tax deductions,
which includes income and property taxes, are now subject to a $10,000 ceiling (Nevius,
2018). The mortgage interest deduction ceiling for new agreements reduced from
$1,000,000 to $750,000 and is no longer available for second homes (Nevius, 2018). As
previously noted, the TCJA also disallowed the deduction of charitable contributions that
result in seating rights for collegiate athletic events (Nevius, 2018). By lowering and
eliminating these deductions, it is difficult for taxpayers to have enough qualifying
itemized deductions to be advantageous over the standard deduction. The increase in the
standard deduction combined with the loss or cap of numerous eligible itemized
deductions reduced the number of filers itemizing deductions. Non-itemizers receive no
benefit from charitable contributions and have a tax price of giving equal to 100%.
Problem Statement
Tax policy has both intended and unintended consequences and interest groups,
including charitable organizations, lobby legislators and the public to inform and
influence decision-makers. Prior to the enactment of the TCJA, the not-for-profit sector
voiced concerns about the potential impact to contributions citing reports that predicted
giving would decrease by $4.9 billion to $16.3 billion annually and have devastating
results for programs of charities (Channick, 2017; O’Neil, 2018). The need for accurate
and thorough research on the predicted effects is of upmost importance to the legislative
process. The public discourse prior to enactment of the TCJA did not fully address the
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long-run impact for a large subsector of charitable entities – those with significant
reliance on endowments. The giving source – individuals, estates, corporations, other
organizations – is also a factor in relevance of the research. Research results point toward
the need for a more specialized application based on the subsector within the charitable
industry.
Extensive research has been performed on the tax-price elasticity of giving,
including post-implementation simulations of specific tax policies. In the 1980s the
nonprofit sector warned of significant drops in contributions if the then-proposed
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were enacted,
much like recent media reports related to the TCJA. A $10 billion, or 20%, decline in
giving from contributions was expected (Clotflelter, 1990). Ricketts and Westfall (1993)
found a slight overestimate with predictions for the 1983 and 1985 decrease in giving
based on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Changes in marginal tax rates and
other elements of the 1980s tax laws led high-income taxpayers to reduce giving by less
than predicted but, as expected, the taxpayers with the largest change in tax price
demonstrated the greatest effect (Auten, Cilke, & Randolph, 1992; Clotfelter, 1990).
Even as the tax laws made it less beneficial to give, average contributions increased
(Auten et al., 1992; Clotfelter, 1990). Research findings on the 1980’s tax acts were
primarily based on the charitable industry as a single sector. Clotfelter’s (1990)
simulation for the Tax Reform Act of 1986 predicted a surge in contributions in 1986
relative to 1987, decreased giving in 1988, and even larger drops in appreciated property
gifts after 1986. Clotfelter (1990) extended the findings to specific subsectors and found
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only two experienced the predicted pattern in giving, higher education and museums, an
indication the forecasted effects are more relevant to specific subsectors.
The measure reported in most research is not only broadly related to the entire
charitable industry, but also is an estimate for a single year inclusive of all types of giving
– expendable for current year operations as well as nonexpendable for endowment
building. For example, Gravelle and Marples (2010) predicted the decrease in overall
giving from an itemized deduction cap proposal for the 2011 federal budget as .28%
assuming low tax-price elasticity, 1.44% decrease with moderate elasticity, and 2.27%
decrease with high elasticity. Very few studies examine effects on a granular level.
Cordes (2011) simulated the potential effects of a 28 percent cap for the maximum rate at
which all charitable contributions are deductible and disaggregated the simulated changes
by different types of charitable causes. The study calculated a 1.4 percent reduction in
total revenue for higher education nonprofits caused by an assumed ten percent loss in
contributions (Cordes, 2011). Even fewer studies examine more specific giving such as
donations to endowments of higher education. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) simulated
proposed tax policies using historical data for university and college endowments and
found the long-run impact of eliminating or reducing charitable contribution deductions
would impair small-endowed schools the greatest.
University wealth, measured by the endowment value per student, is associated
with greater efforts to build the endowment and giving toward the endowment
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003). While there is significant research on variables correlated
with alumni giving to higher education institutions, little is available on other sources of
giving or profiles of donors to endowments. Individuals, not just alumni, contribute
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toward endowment and are subject to personal income tax laws. Corporations and other
organizations, while also subject to tax law, do not have the same or as significant of
incentives to donate. Measuring impact for the not-for-profit sector broadly leads to
interested parties lacking erudition needed for a well-informed debate.
Scope of the Study
Currently there is limited research on tax policy effects in higher education.
Personal income tax policy has primarily been examined in the context of charities as a
single industry with little attention given to specific subsectors within the industry. For
the research that is available on tax policy implications for higher education, findings
primarily identify the impact on overall giving and do not address the long-run effects on
endowments. This study attempts to quantify the long-run impact of the TCJA on the
endowments of higher education institutions. By using historical endowment giving,
return, and spending, I estimated the ending market value of the endowment ten years
post-implication of the TCJA had the policy been enacted in 2008. The components of
TCJA addressed only relate to personal income tax provisions and do not encompass
corporations, bequests, or other organizations. For this reason, I also sought to identify
the institutional characteristics of universities with heavier reliance on individual giving
to endowments.
The research questions addressed in this study include:
1. What is the long-run financial impact of a tax policy proposal that changes the
tax price of giving on endowments of higher education institutions?
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2. What institutional characteristics identify institutions with greater relevance to
personal income tax policies measured by higher reliance on individual giving
to university endowments?
Contributions of the Study
Research on tax price influence for specific charitable causes is limited and using
broad nonprofit data to analyze the impact to a subsector may result in misleading
assessments. Most studies that simulate the impact of tax policy on charitable
contributions aggregate all giving and focus only on the change in revenue, overlooking
the complexity of endowments. Generalized estimates are not appropriate for the portion
of the nonprofit sector heavily reliant on endowments, as is the case with higher
education, arts, and private foundations. For endowment giving, it is short-sighted to
measure the impact in terms of a single-year reduction in revenue. The full consequences
of the single-year revenue loss will be realized over multiple years. This study examines
the comprehensive impact by accounting for the long-run implications. The research
findings provide an important contribution to ongoing debates about rising higher
education costs and accumulating endowment wealth by universities. Likewise, the
findings provide insight into the universities and colleges that are most susceptible to the
endowment projections. As policymakers consider tax policies to correct or improve the
issues and administrators testify to the impact of policy proposals, research on the
financial consequences will be an important element necessary for a well-informed
debate. Without thoroughly considering the financial impact to the higher education
subsector, tax policies may result in unintended consequences contrary to the original
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purpose. While this study is limited to higher education, the methodology can be applied
to other subsectors that have a similar high reliance on endowments.

Copyright © Jennifer W. Siebenthaler 2019
22

Chapter 2: Literature Review
This literature review examines previous research critical to supporting the
importance of this study. The chapter is divided into sections aimed at addressing three
fundamental questions. Why does impact on endowments matter? What variables impact
endowments? Does tax policy impact contributions? A brief history of the endowment’s
significance to the university and exploration into the theoretical rationale for holding
endowments speak to the first question. Research is then reviewed for each component of
the endowment growth formula: contributions, return on investments, and fund
distributions. The last half century produced extensive research on tax price elasticity of
giving with many advancements and refinements aimed at determining tax policy
influence. Finally, a review is provided of the limited research simulating tax policy to
quantify impact on higher education endowments.
University Endowment
Endowments existed in the earliest histories of American higher education and,
according to Hansmann (1990), “played a more important role in the finances of
universities in the nineteenth century than they do now” (p. 23). Hansmann noted that
neither Harvard nor Yale held significant endowments until public funding ceased in the
early 1800s, requiring the institutions to actively seek new funding. By the 1840s,
endowment income generated more than 40% of their annual budgets (Hansmann, 1990).
Even though unprecedented large gifts were flowing into many universities in the late
1800s, the finances of institutions were largely the responsibility of trustees and key
wealthy donors (Bremmer, 1988; Kimball, 2015), but many institutions depended on
endowments to be able to charge no or low tuition (Thelin & Trollinger, 2014).
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Endowments were expected to generate income for the university in order to
support operational and capital costs. By 1900 Harvard was the endowment role model
with about 50% of income generated by their endowment as compared to an average of
25% for all universities in America (Kimball & Johnson, 2012b). Endowment income
contributed significant support in the 1920s and 1930s; 52% of Stanford’s and 32% of
University of Chicago’s budgets were provided by endowment income during this time
period (Goetzmann et al., 2010). In this same era, the General Education Board published
a recommendation that universities should strive to have endowments cover 40% to 60%
of university expenditures (as cited in Kimball & Johnson, 2012b, p. 13). Universities
realized Harvard had a competitive advantage and began to more fully appreciate the
potential value of an endowment. Those interested in the higher education sector had
strong faith in the future of endowments as a primary revenue source. Jesse Sears, an
education academic, noted in his 1922 historical study of philanthropy in higher
education, “At the present rate of growth, and with no more than normal expansion, these
colleges will in time become practically independent of income from other sources” (p.
67). His predication, however, did not come to pass.
A consistent measure of support is not available for much of the remaining 1900s.
By the 1990s, according to Helms, Henkin, and Murray (2005), endowment income
accounted for only 5.2% of private institution revenues and less for public institutions.
Smith (2015) found the Ivy League colleges provided over 30% of operating budgets
from endowment income in 2009 and 2010. The most recent NTSE reported universities
have an average of 10.3% of their operating budget funded by endowments (NACUBO,
2019a). There is disparity according to size with the largest institutions reporting an

24

average 16.7% and the smaller institutions reporting 6.9% of their operating budget
supported by the endowment (NACUBO, 2019a).
If endowments are not contributing significantly to operating budgets, why are
these investment vehicles so heavily revered and guarded? Tobin (1974), in one of the
earliest papers on endowments, asserted governing bodies of “an endowed institution are
the guardians of the future against the claims of the present” and cited equity
perseveration as the purpose of endowments (p. 427). Hansmann (1990) provided the
most oft-cited theoretical exploration into why universities hold endowments, including
to serve as a financial buffer, insure long-run survival of reputation, protect intellectual
freedom, and assist in preserving the current generation’s values. Fisman and Hubbard
(2003) found evidence that nonprofits use endowments as precautionary savings devices.
Helms et al. (2005) noted higher education endowments specifically serve as
precautionary savings and further studied the impact of donor restrictions on the
management of the endowments. However, Brown, Dimmock, Kang, and Weisbenner
(2010) examined university behavior in response to the technology bubble collapse and
did not find income-smoothing behavior. Instead, universities, in response to the financial
shock, reduced operating expenses and cut the endowment payout rates. Hansmann
(1990) noted spending policies based on a portion of the endowment value violate the
notion of a financial buffer. Based on university behavior during the Great Recession, the
Center for Social Philanthropy Tellus Institute (2011) found evidence contradicting the
assumption that endowments help protect operations, documenting canceled projects and
loss of jobs.
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Universities benefit from having large endowments in national rankings of
colleges and credit analysts’ evaluations of financial strength. College rankings are
important to attract students and provide prestige. Endowment size, stated in total and as
a per-student-enrolled figure, is often referenced as an indication of financial and
reputational strength in mainstream media and the institutions’ student recruiting
materials. The ability to obtain debt enables growth, capital investment, and a
competitive advantage over peer institutions. Hansmann (1990) also noted trustees, with
more business than education backgrounds, focus on the financial assets as a measure of
success, creating a culture with increased importance placed on endowment performance.
Core, Guay, and Verdi (2006) found most nonprofit organizations with excessive
endowments paid higher CEO and director salaries and did not exhibit subsequent
growth. They concluded excess endowments are associated with greater agency
problems. After examining data on investment committee membership of universities,
Brown, Dimmock, Kang, and Weisbenner (2014) found university presidents are in the
position to exert significant influence over endowment distribution decisions. As
Hansmann (1990) pointed out, the endowment management and spending rules seem
inconsistent with the compelling reasons for establishing endowments.
Donor restrictions may require perpetual life of endowment gifts and these
restrictions are legally binding and limit the university’s ability to control distributions.
However, not all endowments consist of only permanently restricted gifts and most
universities establish quasi-endowments that function in the same manner without the
external constraints. As tuition costs and student debt continues to rise, focus is turning to
these endowments as a source to reduce the cost of higher education. Two-thirds of
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education endowments are permanently restricted, and an estimated 80 percent of public
universities’ and 55 percent of private universities’ accumulated wealth consist of
restricted endowments (Calabrese & Ely, 2017; Waldeck, 2009). Therefore, private
universities are more likely to have the flexibility to spend from their endowments. Donor
restrictions are a valid premise for protecting the corpus of the endowment, but not sound
reasoning for exponential growth. The Government Accountability Office (2010)
released a study on university endowments finding that institutions had not only
preserved but increased the purchasing power of endowment funds over the previous two
decades. Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) found selective private research universities and
liberal arts colleges with higher levels of endowment wealth per student had higher levels
of giving from all sources. They also found higher levels of endowment wealth per
student were associated with a greater share of annual giving directed towards building
the endowment – indicating that the wealthy schools will continue to get wealthier.
While all the aforementioned reasons for maintaining large endowments make
financial and operational sense, they are not framed in the tax-exempt purpose of higher
education. Thelin and Trollinger (2010) argued “the public derives little or no discernible
benefit from the accumulation of charitable funds” (p. 7). Providing financial security,
improving rankings, and maintaining liquidity are organization-sustaining movements,
not strategies to further a charitable purpose. Other reasons are discussed, but Hansmann
(1990) closed with the simple proposition that universities are maintaining large
endowments out of habit.
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Summary.
The contribution of the endowment to the operating budget has declined but the
perceived value to higher education institutions has not. Without consensus on the
purpose and objectives of endowments, underlying concerns of the general public,
legislators, and media remain: how much is enough for an endowment size and can an
institution can have too much endowment. In the absence of understanding why
endowments are protected, research focuses on if and how endowments are safeguarded.
University Endowment Management
University endowment research centers on the management of the entities as
investment vehicles. This section outlines the key elements of growth: contribution,
return, and distribution. Goetzmann and Oster (2013) found evidence that universities
mimic nearest competitors in asset allocation decisions subsequent to superior
performance by the other university, an indication that universities are not only actively
managing their own endowments but are also exerting energy in benchmarking within the
higher education sector. Cejnek, Franz, and Stoughton (2017) found behavior of a
substitution effect belief between donations and returns for universities. Brown et al.
(2014) created a “President’s Benchmark” measure and found supporting evidence that
university presidents make decisions based on the endowment value at the beginning of
their tenure. These studies demonstrate universities have overall endowment value
objectives that require strategic management of all the growth components.
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Growth components.
Contribution.
Research on giving to higher education institutions concentrates, primarily, on the
giving of alumni. Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) found institutions with more
need-based aid had higher levels of alumni giving but no correlation with merit-based
aid, while Clotfelter (2003) found individual alumni receiving need-based aid were less
likely to subsequently give. Clotfelter’s study used a sample of alumni from three cohorts
of students at fourteen elite private institutions and provides evidence that satisfaction of
the college experience increases giving, more significantly for students that attended a
public high school or attended their first-choice college (2003). Not surprisingly,
Clotfelter (2003) and Bruggink and Siddiqui (1995) showed income positively impacted
level of giving and Clotfelter (2003) also found giving was increased for the first
institution attended and by liberal arts graduates. Other positive determinates are alumni
activity and participation in social fraternity organizations (Bruggink & Siddiqui, 1995;
Harrison, Mitchell, & Peterson, 1995). Bruggink and Siddiqui (1995) noted increased
geographic distance to the institution from current residence negatively impacted giving,
however Lara and Johnson (2014) found the opposite in a study with a large sample from
one institution.
Numerous institutional characteristics are considered related to giving. Positive
correlations were found with a larger portion of full-time students (Liu, 2006; Terry &
Macy, 2007; Harrison et al., 1995), the private institution structure (Terry & Macy,
2007), more faculty per student (Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002), and higher
acceptance rates (Terry & Macy, 2007). Liu (2006) found rankings were positively
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correlated with giving from non-alumni. Leslie and Ramey (1988) found no correlation
for non-alumni but did find increased alumni giving with institutional prestige measured
by university age and ranking.
Multiple studies found endowment value was positively correlated with giving
from both alumni and non-alumni even when measured in a variety of ways such as total
value (Terry & Macy, 2007), per alumnus (Leslie & Ramey, 1988), and per student
(Cunningham & Cochi-Ficano, 2002). Terry and Macy (2007) found higher student debt
averages and percent of Pell Grant recipients decreased alumni giving. While Liu (2006)
positively correlated in-state tuition charges to alumni giving, Terry and Macy (2007)
found negative correlation with cost of room and board. Several studies examined state
appropriations. Liu (2006) and Leslie and Ramey (1988) linked state appropriations as
negatively associated with alumni contributions, with Leslie and Ramey extending the
correlation to all giving groups. Liu (2006), however, found higher levels of state funding
increased giving from corporations. Gianneschi (2004) agreed but specifies that it is for
restricted giving and included non-alumni individuals. However, Gianneschi (2004)
found no relationship between unrestricted giving and state appropriations for any group.
Return.
Performance is dependent on asset allocation. As addressed in a previous section,
the evolution of the endowment investment strategy shifted from maximizing
distributable income to maximizing growth, achieved by selection of asset categories in
which funds are invested. The investment return, or performance, of endowments creates
resources for distributions to support university operations and increases the earning
power by growing the corpus. Lerner, Schoar, and Wang (2008) found university
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endowments outperformed other institutional investors, such as corporate pension funds,
over a 20-year period ended 2005. Agarwal, Nanda, and Ray (2013) confirmed the
finding. Barber and Wang (2013) supported the commonly-held belief that elite
institutions, Ivy League and top-SAT schools, earn strong returns as compared to all
university endowments but also found the average university endowment performed in
line with the market’s average benchmark returns, rebutting the belief that higher
education endowments are superior performers. More recently Dahiya and Yermack
(2018) examined the nonprofit sector endowments with similar results. They found
higher education institutions significantly underperformed the market, more so than the
entire nonprofit sector. Selective schools were the strongest performers of the higher
education sector but performed near the market average (Dahiya & Yermack, 2018).
The variation in university endowment performance has been contributed to the
size of the endowment, access to professional fund managers, and asset allocation.
Cejnek et al. (2017) countered the size-advantage belief in favor of higher-risk investing
and greater access. Their study revealed that the endowment size corresponded to the
type of management borne out by asset allocation profiles. Larger endowments allocated
more endowment resources to higher-risk classes of investments and spent more as a
fraction of endowment wealth while smaller endowments endeavored to accumulate
endowment wealth (Cejnek et al., 2017). Brown, Garlappi, and Tui (2010) found strategic
asset allocation and active management accounted for the largest portion of variation in
university endowment returns between institutions. In a study of the overall nonprofit
sector, Heutel and Zeckhauser (2014), noted the largest endowments reported the highest
returns and had a higher portion of alternative investments, a high-risk asset class. Barber
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and Wang (2013) found the strongest returns from the largest endowments and attributed
the performance to the significant allocation to alternative investments. University
endowment investments in alternatives, on average, doubled in the decade between the
mid-90s and the mid-00s (Lerner et al., 2008). Agarwal et al. (2013) attributed superior
performance to the opportunity to directly invest funds, as opposed to investing in an
index-fund model, but no evidence that access to the advice of investment consultants
had an impact.
Distribution.
Distribution research centers on spending rule policies and endowment
management decisions as evidenced by modification to those policies. Simulation studies
attempt to find the optimal spending rule (Blume, 2010; Cejnek et al., 2017; Kaufman &
Woglom, 2005), however, factoring in the complexity and variety found in policies
across endowments, there is no universally-accepted ideal spending rule. Universities
have established, modified, suspended, and overhauled payout formulas with earnest.
Brown and Tiu (2013) studied university behavior vis-à-vis spending rules and payout
rates, distinguishing that the rule is the policy the university employs to calculate
distribution amounts and the payout rate is the percentage level applied in the spending
rule. Using a sample of 628 university endowments, Brown and Tiu (2013) examined a
recent decade and found approximately 25% of endowments changed their spending
policy and 18% changed their spending rate in any given year. For the sample examined,
half of the institutions never made a change, 16% made only one change in the examined
timeframe, more than 34% made at least two changes, and one institution made a change
in each of the eight years examined (Brown & Tiu, 2013). Milton and Ehrenberg (2013)
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found spending rate variations did not significantly contribute to the observed dispersion
of higher education endowments. No evidence was found in the Brown and Tiu (2013)
study that returns were impacted by the frequency of policy changes. Institutions with
larger allocations of alternative assets had lower probabilities of changing the spending
policy but larger endowments with lower relative returns were more likely to modify
(Brown & Tiu, 2013).
Research supports endowment policies are adjusted in response to external
environments. Dybvig (1999) found payouts slowly increased after positive shocks but no
evidence of declines following negative shocks. Gilbert and Hrdlicka (2013) agreed
payout rates increased with positive shocks but concluded payout rates also decreased
with negative shocks. Ryan (2016) found during the Great Recession of 2008-09 some
universities ignored their own formulas and opted to decrease payouts at rates greater
than the formulas dictated. He characterized this move by universities as evidence that
“they acted to preserve the value of the endowment instead of using the endowment to
preserve the value of the university” (Ryan, 2016, p. 26). Brown et al. (2014) included
the 2001-02 tech bubble burst and the Great Recession and also found that universities
reduced payout rates after these negative shocks to endowments, but universities did not
change payout rates following positive shocks, nor did universities respond likewise to
negative shocks to other revenue sources such as governmental funding. Only Brown and
Tiu (2013) addressed the use of special appropriations (temporarily-instituted payouts
outside of the spending formula), noting if the option was available the likelihood an
institution adjusted spending policies was reduced.

33

Summary.
The importance of how endowments are managed is supported by the
proliferation of research on each of the growth components. Contributions, return on
investments, and distributions from the endowment all impact the size and spending
power of the asset. Recent history reflects a conservative approach to spending from the
endowment but a speculative approach to asset allocation. Profiles of primary donor
groups can alter the practices of philanthropy units and research on university behavior
will continue to inform administrators seeking to optimize performance.
Tax Price Elasticity of Giving
This section begins with an instructive review of the context and application of
tax price elasticity of giving. Following the background is a summary of the published
literature reviews covering the first two decades of research and an overview of the
traditional view. Key research methodology and data modifications for the most recent
three decades are then reviewed. The remaining portions of this section address empirical
research topics of anticipated, transitory, and persistent changes, elasticity of nonitemizers, elasticity based on income class and giving-size classes, price elasticity by
nonprofit sector, and elasticity for charitable bequests.
Responsiveness to changes in the charitable contribution deduction and tax rates
is measured by the tax price elasticity of giving – the percentage change in donations
resulting from a one percent change in the price of giving, all else being equal. Tax policy
is interested in determining if it is more economical to provide the tax benefit to generate
donations for the nonprofit sector or to directly subsidize the sector instead. Tax price
elasticity of giving is used to estimate the impact of changes in tax code on charitable
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giving. Price elasticity of giving is believed to be negative; an increase in tax price causes
a decrease in giving. Negative one indicates the increase in donations exactly offsets the
decrease in tax revenue. Calculated values of elasticity at or above the absolute value of
one are considered elastic and, likewise, below the absolute value of one are inelastic.
Elasticities greater than the absolute value of one signify giving will increase by more
than the loss in tax revenue to the government. If the value of induced giving is greater
than the value of the lost tax revenue, referred to as elastic, the charitable deduction is
considered “treasury efficient.” Most literature exploring the tax price elasticity of giving
also examines the income elasticity of giving. Income elasticity measures the percentage
change in giving resulting from a one percent change in after-tax income. Income is
believed to be inelastic, although questions of persistent verses transitory income
challenge this belief.
The application of tax price elasticity of giving in tax policy analysis estimates the
impact of proposed tax code changes. Studies often assume a single tax price elasticity,
such as the Congressional Research Study by Gravelle and Marples (2010) which
assumed a -0.5 elasticity to estimate the impact of an itemized deduction cap. A recent
report by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy (2017) estimated
the impact of various proposed tax reforms under two different assumptions – a low price
elasticity of -0.5 and the higher elasticity of unity, -1.0, citing the reason for doing so as
the significant debate that still exists regarding elasticity estimates (p. 7). For an example
application, assume a tax price elasticity of -1.1. If the marginal tax rate decreases from
35% to 30%, the tax price increases from .65 to .70, a 7.7% increase. The increase in tax
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price would result in an 8.5% decrease in contributions (7.7% increase in tax price x -1.1
tax price elasticity), assuming all other factors remain unchanged.
While there is consensus that many factors potentially stimulate or depress
contributions, research questions the extent tax incentives motivate those changes.
Regression analysis is used to estimate these elasticities and the traditional log-linear
model takes the general form:
!" $%,' = ) + +, (!" .%,' ) + +0 1!" 2%,' 3 + +4 5%,' + 6%,' ,
where G is giving measured by the charitable contribution deduction, P is the tax price
discussed above, Y is personal income, D is a vector of demographic variables (most
commonly marital status, age, and number of dependents), and i and t represent the
individual taxpayer and time. Coefficients +, and +0 are the estimates of tax price
elasticity and income elasticity, respectively. Duquette (2016) notes most studies employ
“panel fixed-effects models that use households at different income levels as
counterfactual comparison groups for each other” (p. 51).
One of the most significant challenges to elasticity research is distinguishing the
effects of price and income. Tax price is directly linked to income, as tax rate is
determined by income bracket. Typically, price variation is based on the disparity in
marginal federal income tax rates across people and time (Bakija & Heim, 2011). A
second significant challenge is overcoming bias resulting from omitted variables that
influence giving. Researchers routinely control for various demographic variables such as
age, marital status, and number of dependents. More elusive variables, such as wealth and
religion, are difficult to estimate and others, such as attitudes and social capital, are
impractical to measure.
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Prior to empirical research on the subject, the tax price elasticity of giving was
believed to be inelastic. The first econometric study, performed by Taussig, was
published in 1967 and supported the theory that tax price elasticity was weak and income
elasticity was strong (Clotfelter, 1985). Research immediately following Taussig’s
seminal work modeled his methodology but typically refuted his findings (Clotfelter,
1985). Feldstein (1975), however, formed a pooled time-series that resulted in a price
elasticity estimate of -1.24 and income elasticity of 0.82, concluding that tax price
elasticity is greater than previously believed. Subsequent research into the 1980s supports
Feldstein’s findings. By 1985, the consensus was that tax price of giving is elastic and
treasury efficient.
Clotfelter (1985) outlined key issues with the earlier models such as endogeneity
of tax variables and multicollinearity of price and income. Endogeneity is addressed by
use of the “first-dollar” measure of tax price, calculated as the marginal tax rate on the
first dollar donated. Researchers recognized that taxpayers may donate in order to qualify
for itemization on the tax return. For itemizers who contribute in order to itemize, the
correct first-dollar price is one (Clotfelter, 1985, p. 89). These “borderline itemizers,”
taxpayers unable to itemize if no donations were made, are excluded from the regression
of tax file data. The need for independent verification was first addressed by exploiting
differences in state income tax rates or changes in federal tax rates over time, and the
results remained consistent with previous studies (Clotfelter, 1985, p. 81). Other model
concerns were remedied as well. For example, the measure of giving, the dependent
variable, is the charitable contribution deduction claimed on the tax return, which is zero
in the case of nongivers. A common practice that continues today is to add an
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insignificant sum, such as $1 or $10, to all giving variables to eliminate the $0 variables.
Several researchers employ a Tobit model to accommodate for zero balance variables
such as no donations given (Brooks, 2017; Duquette, 1999; Tiehen, 2001). Early models
are considered “static” as cross-sectional or time-series data are utilized (Barrett, 1991).
Broman (1989) first transitioned the traditional static model into a “dynamic” model by
inclusion of lagged and anticipated variables into a first differenced model. Barrett (1991)
examined the robustness of different models on panel data and determined the preferred
model was two-way dynamic fixed-effects.
Nearly fifty years of research has resulted in many advancements on the theory of
price and elasticity, but not a clear consensus on the precise measure. A meta-analysis
performed by Peloza and Steel (2005) on 69 empirical studies spanned four decades of
research. The estimates from the studies varied from an unusual positive elasticity of 0.12
to a highly negative elasticity of -7.07 (Peloza & Steel, 2005, p. 261). In the metaanalysis, the weighted mean of the price elasticity of giving was -1.44 with a standard
deviation of 1.21. When outliers (more than three standard deviations from the mean)
were removed, the weighted average fell to -1.11 (Peloza & Steel, 2005, p. 265),
supporting the theory of elasticity.
Data sets used in research.
Early regression research on tax price elasticity was dependent on the limited data
available. The two basic data sources were cross-sectional data from individual tax
returns of itemizers and household surveys (Clotfelter 1985). As panel data became
readily available, researchers were able to adapt methodologies. Panel data sets are more
persuasive by reducing omission of relevant variables, allowing price and income effects
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to be distinguishable, and permitting dynamic effects, such as timing, to be measured
(Barrett, McGuirek, & Steinberg, 1997, p. 322; Steinberg, 1990, p. 71). Researchers
theorized that panel data obtained lower elasticities (Steinberg, 1990). However, Peloza
and Steel (2005) did not find support in their meta-analysis for the theory of lower price
elasticities with studies based on panel data as compared to studies based on crosssectional data. More recent research primarily employs regression analysis on panel data
sets of individual taxpayer returns, but not exclusively.
Greater use of tax data is not an indication of superiority over survey data.
Clotfelter (1985) noted the largest price elasticities were found using 1973 survey data (2.10 to -2.54) and aggregate tax return data appeared to be less reliable since more
variety (-0.42 to -1.34) was found in research based on that source. Clotfelter (1985) and
Duquette (2016) summarized concerns about systematic reporting errors that can be
present in both sets, including overstating of donations by itemizers to evade tax and
understating of donations by non-itemizers due to lack of recordkeeping. Hurst, Li, and
Pugsley found tax evaders did not provide truthful responses on household surveys either
(as cited in Duquette, 2016, p. 53). Overstatements of donations can suppress elasticity
estimates and Peloza and Steel (2005) found support in their meta-analysis that tax data
generated lower price elasticities (mean of -1.08) than survey data price elasticity
estimates (mean of -1.29). However, by examining audited as compared to unaudited tax
data, Clotfelter (1985) found overstatement of deductions did not lead to systematic bias
of the price effect (p. 92). The meta-analysis failed to find support that audited tax data
generated lower price elasticities than unaudited tax data, confirming previous findings
(Peloza & Steel, 2005, p. 267).
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While taxpayer data is often considered more reliable, survey data can provide a
richer breadth of information. Potentially relevant variables are not present in tax data
such as wealth measurements, non-itemizer donations, and contribution destinations.
Researchers have attempted to use a proxy for wealth such as interest and dividend
income (Lin & Lo, 2012) and, as discussed below, a short window of tax reform created
taxpayer data for non-itemizers. Individual taxpayer returns do not provide any variable
to determine the charity receiving monetary donations. Until recently, researchers
attempting to estimate price elasticity by nonprofit sector relied exclusively on household
survey data. A limited number of studies beginning in 2013 used tax data from the
recipient charitable organizations through their Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form
990, the information return of public charities and private foundations. In theory, the
contribution measure includes all monetary gifts from all income groups and both
itemizers and non-itemizers. The empirical research findings are discussed in a following
section of this paper, but the relatively new data set has yet to receive widespread
acceptance.
Empirical research areas of concentration.
Anticipated, transitory, and persistent changes.
After comparing actual giving to predicted giving based on the traditional
regression model for the 1979 to 1990 time period, Auten, et al. (1992) identified several
limitations of the traditional model. The traditional model does not account for
expectations about future price and income measures, does not distinguish between
transitory and persistent tax price changes, and assumes that transitory and persistent
income changes will elicit the same response from all taxpayers (Auten et al., 1992).
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Anticipation of changes may cause taxpayers to shift giving across tax periods, causing
an appearance of a change in the level of giving but is instead only a change in the timing
of giving. Elasticity estimates are exaggerated if time shifting is ignored (Barrett et al.,
1997). The responses may also differ depending on whether the change is transitory or
persistent. Persistent tax price changes resulted from the 1981 and 1986 tax reforms and
transitory tax price changes occurred with the phase-in of marginal tax rate reductions
during reform (Auten, Sieg, & Clotfelter, 2002, p. 374).
The first empirical study to give evidence that anticipation of price changes
impacts giving was published by Broman (1989), capitalizing on the significant tax rate
reductions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Whereas previous research
considered the giving of subjects in different tax brackets, thus different tax prices of
giving, Broman shifted the focus to how giving behavior changes when price changes.
Using the first differenced model, price and income elasticities were estimated with data
on changes. The result was much smaller price elasticity than provided by the traditional
model. Broman (1989) concluded that contributions were much more sensitive to an
anticipated future price change than to the current price of giving. Although Clotfelter
(1985) first theorized the traditional model estimates long-run elasticity and the first
difference model estimates short-run elasticity, Broman’s research eliminated many of
the weaknesses in his modified model. Randolph (1995) used a two-way random effects
model and included measures for expected future income and expected future tax price.
The results imply taxpayers substitute current giving and future giving to exploit
transitory tax price changes (Randolph, 1995, p. 735). Barrett et al. (1997) built on
Broman’s (1989) dynamic model by including lagged giving to measure habit persistence
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and lagged and future income variables to measure consumption smoothing. With a
similar model but including local and state tax rates in the price and a panel covering a
longer timeframe, Bakija and Heim (2011) found taxpayers altered donations in advance
to large obvious future changes in federal marginal tax rates but found less conclusive
evidence of the response to more subtle sources of future price changes (p. 618).
Auten et al. (2002) found little supporting evidence of an impact from past or
future prices but concluded that persistent changes had substantially larger impact on
giving than transitory changes. These findings counter Randolph’s (1995) conclusion that
persistent price elasticity is smaller in absolute value (less than unity) than transitory
price elasticity (greater than unity). He argued that by not separately measuring
permanent and transitory income, previous research overestimated the effect of
permanent price changes (Randolph, 1995, p. 735). The income measure was
traditionally determined to be adjusted gross income less federal income tax assuming no
donations. However, Friedman theorized as early as 1957 that normal, not actual, levels
of income should be used and Feldstein and Clotfelter introduced a multi-year average
for the income variable in 1976 (as cited in Clotfelter, 1985, p.55). Subsequent studies
differed in how the income variable is measured, using either current income or, for
example, an average of multiple years to determine permanent income (Brooks, 2007). In
an effort to reduce omitted variable bias, Bakija and Heim (2011) incorporated local and
state tax rates into the tax price measure which allowed observations of taxpayers with
the same income but different tax prices, finding persistent price elasticity greater than
unity. Table 1.1 provides an overview of the transitory verses persistent tax price
elasticities estimates.
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Table 1.1
Tax price elasticities of giving – transitory verses persistent
Publication
Transitory

Persistent

Broman (1989)

-0.22 to -0.28

-0.32 to -0.41

Clotfelter (1985)

-0.24 to -0.94

-0.45 to -1.55

Barrett et al. (1997)

-0.47

Randolph (1995)

-1.55

-0.51

Auten et al. (2002)

-0.04 to -0.61

-0.79 to -1.26

Bakija & Heim (2011)

-0.78 to -0.80

-1.53 to -1.40

Brooks (2007)

-2.70

Brooks (2017)

-3.00

Non-itemizers’ elasticity.
A significant limitation to elasticity estimates based on individual taxpayer data is
exclusion of non-itemizers. By focusing only on itemizers, the tax price elasticity is
potentially overstated and results in exaggerated estimates of tax reform impact on
charitable contributions (Backus & Grant, 2018). In most years, non-itemizers have a tax
price of one since they receive no tax benefit from a charitable contribution. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 briefly provided an “above the line” charitable
contribution deduction for non-itemizers. The deduction was limited in the first four
years (25% of the first $100 of gifts in 1982 and 1983, 25% of the first $300 of gifts in
1984, 50% of all gifts in 1985), without limits (all gifts fully deductible) in 1986, and
expired in 1987. According to Duquette (1999), the first study using the 1980s tax data to
specifically estimate non-itemizer giving was inconclusive due to large standard errors (p.
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197). Dunbar and Phillips (1997) used cross-sectional data and, while admitting to
omitted variables bias and high multicollinearity, found the tax price primarily impacted
the decision to give but not the level of giving. Using ordinary least squares on panel data
of non-itemizers, Dunbar and Phillips (1997) estimated a highly elastic (-3.356) tax price
supporting the theory that the non-itemizer deduction is treasury efficient. Dunbar and
Phillips (1997) concluded that the reduced tax price of giving induced non-itemizers to
increase giving in 1986 and induced 1985 non-givers to become givers in 1986. Duquette
(1999) employed Tobit regression on the same data set but included itemizers as a
comparison. He not only found giving was less price elastic for non-itemizers (-0.637) as
compared to itemizers (-1.241), but also disputed previous findings that the non-itemizer
deduction was treasury efficient (Duquette, 1999). Meta-analysis findings do not support
the hypothesis that itemizers have higher price elasticities than non-itemizers (Peloza &
Steel, 2005). With the limited empirical research available, it is difficult to confidently
state a consensus regarding the tax price elasticity of the non-itemizer deduction.
Income classes and giving-size classes.
Several studies considered the possibility of varying price elasticities between
different classes of taxpayers such as income classes or giving classes. Clotfelter’s (1985)
literature review reflected no firm conclusion that price elasticity varies by income class.
Research suggests higher income groups have greater price elasticity, but the limited
examination of low-income levels prevents precise determination of the variety
(Clotfelter, 1985, p. 71). Using a regression model that includes a measure of permanent
income on a ten-year panel sample of individual taxpayers, Auten et al. (1992) predicted
giving by income class and compared the results to reported giving. The findings
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suggested highest income taxpayers were more sensitive to tax price changes. O’Neil,
Steinberg, and Thompson estimated price elasticities form a U-shape pattern based on
income class, where the more elastic income groups were the lowest and highest classes
(as cited by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 547). Greenwood concluded the elasticity of high-income
groups was less elastic than low income groups (as cited by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 549).
Bakija and Heim (2011) did not find evidence that persistent price elasticities differed
substantially across income classes (p. 642). It appears a 1977 statement by Zellner still
holds, “Simply put, the price elasticities for different income groups have not been
determined very precisely” (as cited by Clotfelter, 1985, p. 71).
Using censored quantile regression, Lin and Lo (2012) considered price elasticity
variance based on level of giving. Literature addressing the reasons donors give offer
theories reflecting the size of gifts. Reinstein posits large givers are more committed to
charitable giving and, thus, less price elastic and Smith, Kehoe, and Cremer believe
altruistic givers will always give something (as cited by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 537). Lin and
Lo (2012) provided empirical evidence that donors at lower giving quantiles are price
elastic but donors at higher giving quantiles are price inelastic. Following common
practice, the study only included itemizers and, as a result, may not properly reflect lower
giving quantiles. In addition, the study used cross-sectional data, preventing the
separation of persistent and transitory changes. Additional research is needed before a
consensus about these results can be reached.
Elasticity variance within the nonprofit sector.
Various research considers elasticity of giving within the nonprofit sector. Most
of this research relies on household survey data since individual taxpayer returns provide
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little to no information about the destination of charitable contributions. The earliest
studies agree that elasticities do vary by nonprofit sector but do not agree on the elasticity
estimates. Feldstein (1975) found giving to religious organizations was inelastic but
estimated the price elasticity for private education organizations to be highly elastic.
Reece (1979) found the opposite, estimating religious giving to be elastic while private
education elasticity was only about -0.08. Bradley, Holden, and McClelland (1999)
supported the view that religious giving had very low elasticity, especially when
compared to social welfare organizations. Brooks (2007) estimated elasticities greater
than unity for each religious, educational, and social welfare organizations. The most
recent studies using 2009 survey data estimated higher elasticity. Brooks (2017) found
both religious and secular giving to be highly elastic, well above unity, and religious
giving to be more elastic than giving to secular organizations. Zampelli and Yen (2017)
estimated elasticity between -1.42 to -2.72 depending on charity. Hungerman and OttoniWilhelm (2016) obtained donation data from a nationally-recognized university and,
based on state tax credit eligibility for in-state donors, found a tax price elasticity
between -0.121 and -0.293.
As discussed in a prior section of this paper, there are a limited number of studies
estimating elasticities from information returns of charitable organizations submitted to
the IRS. Using the Form 990 allows the researcher to capture all donations recognized by
specific tax-exempt entities and to categorize giving by sector. Yetman and Yetman
(2013) published the first extensive study estimating elasticity for 24 types of nonprofits.
Seven sectors, including private education, had high price elasticity averaging -2.3 while
the remaining types were inelastic, with estimates not significantly different from zero
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(Yetman & Yetman, 2013). Duquette (2016) found elasticities ranging from -2.5 to -5.0
depending on the sector and found evidence that larger organizations had higher
elasticities than smaller nonprofits. Duquette interpreted the findings as “illuminating
previously unobservable heterogeneity across charities” instead of a contradiction to
previous research results of much smaller elasticities (Duquette, 2016, 68).
Using the education sector as an example, Table 2.1 illustrates the variance found
in the tax price elasticity estimates.
Table 2.1
Private education sector tax price elasticities of giving
Publication
Education Higher
education
Reece (1979)

-0.08

Yetman & Yetman (2013)

-1.01

Brooks (2007)

-1.18

Feldstein (1975)

-2.23

Duquette (2016)

-2.90

Hungerman & Ottoni-Wilhelm (2016)

-2.54
-0.20

Elasticity of charitable bequests.
Most research focuses on inter-vivos giving and limited attention is given to
charitable bequests. Estates are subject to different tax rates than individual income and
are allowed unlimited charitable contribution deductions. While only a small percentage
of estates are subject to the estate tax and only a small percentage of those subject to the
tax include bequests, the impact of tax policy on estates is important to charitable
organizations that significantly benefit from bequests, often in the form of endowments.
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The model for estate tax price elasticity estimates is similar to the traditional model for
individual giving with the exception that estate size is measured instead of disposable
income. Peloza and Steel’s (2005) meta-analysis examined the eight available empirical
research studies to test the hypothesis that tax price is more elastic for bequests than other
forms of giving. Results from the meta-analysis supported the theory and found the
difference in the means (-1.50 for bequest estimates as compare to -1.18 for other forms
of donations) was considerable (p. 267). The limited research on bequests prevents
widely accepted consensus, however Clotefelter (1985) identified three basic conclusions
that still hold today: (a) bequests are subject to tax-induced price effects in the same
manner as inter-vivos giving, (b) tax price is more elastic for larger estates than smaller
estates, and (c) bequest research results are not as robust as individual giving research
results (p. 249).
Summary.
Fifty years after the first empirical study of the tax price elasticity of giving there
are significant advancements in the theoretical framework and methodology, but not in
refined estimates. The inaugural theory was of relatively inelastic tax price, however
regression analysis soon refuted that theory. Since that time, the prevailing theory has
been that the tax price is elastic, but questions remain concerning treasury efficiency.
Panel data sets, persistent and transitory measures, and theories surrounding time-shifting
and lagging responses altered belief in the strength of the elasticity. Studies on persistent
verses transitory changes and elasticity variance between taxpayer or donor classes are
likely to be extended. Other areas, such as the elasticity of non-itemizers, suffer from
limited recent data availability to allow further exploration. A promising area for future
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study on tax price elasticity is the relatively recent use of IRS Form 990 data. While
considerable progress has been made, the debate continues in the quest to find a precise
estimate of tax price elasticity.
Tax Policy Effect
Limited research centered on the tax policy effect of higher education
endowments is available. This section reviews literature that employed simulations based
on either enacted or proposed legislation. A brief discussion of private foundation
research is included. Private foundations have an operational likeness to endowments and
are subject to significant tax regulation similar to both proposed and newly enacted
legislation, such as the net investment income tax on private university endowments.
Simulations with enacted tax reform.
The tax reforms of the 1980s provided an opportunity to assess tax price elasticity
models with implemented tax policies. As Clotfelter (1990) highlighted, models are not
expected to accurately predict the future if omitted variables change, for example the
stock market crash of October 1987. The simulations of the 1980s largely pointed to
giving was reasonably consistent with the model predictions, but contributions reported
by the nonprofit sector did increase. Ricketts and Westfall (1993) made predictions for
1983 and 1985 based on the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and found significant
underestimates in both years using the traditional tax price elasticity model but a very
slight overestimate with a random coefficients regression model. Auten et al. (1992)
found high-income taxpayers reduced giving by less than predicted but, as expected, the
taxpayers with the largest change in tax price demonstrated the greatest effect. Average
contributions, however, increased even as the tax laws made it less beneficial to give
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(Auten et al., 1992). Clotfelter’s (1990) simulation predicted a surge in contributions in
1986 relative to 1987, decreased giving in 1988, and even larger drops in appreciated
property gifts after 1986. Higher education institutions did experience the predicted
fluctuations and, in addition, Clotfelter (1990) found income classes with the largest tax
price increases decreased contributions with the highest-income donors giving smaller
shares of total contributions. These simulations were limited by the lack of data with
samples of itemizer tax return information only.
Simulations of proposed tax reform.
Gravelle and Marples (2010) analyzed an itemized deduction cap proposal for the
2011 federal budget which had an expected 19.2% increase in tax price for taxpayers in
the highest tax bracket. The analysis predicted a .28% decrease in overall giving
assuming low tax-price elasticity, 1.44% decrease with moderate elasticity, and 2.27%
decrease with high elasticity (Gravelle & Marples, 2010). Cordes (2011) simulated the
potential effects of a 28 percent cap for the maximum rate at which all charitable
contributions are deductible and disaggregated the simulated changes by different types
of charitable causes including higher education. To simulate the change, Cordes (2011)
estimated the impact on charitable contributions reported by the Internal Revenue
Service’s Statistics of Income Division assuming two scenarios: (1) the price elasticity of
giving is -0.5 and (2) the price elasticity of giving is -1.0. Cordes (2011) found total
contributions for giving to “education” will decrease by 2.3 to 3.5 percent if the price
elasticity is -0.5 and by 4.4 to 13.8 percent when price elasticity is assumed to be -1.0.
(Note the category of “education” includes, but not exclusively, higher education.)
Cordes (2011) also used data on income class giving patterns collected from two
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household surveys, the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study and the Bank of America
Study of High Net Worth Philanthropy, to disaggregate the change in giving across the
different types of charitable causes. The effect on the nonprofit finances was then
demonstrated by contextualizing the reduction in contributions within the framework of
total revenues. Cordes (2011) applied an assumed ten percent decrease in contributions to
28 major groups of nonprofits, an assumption that was in the upper range of projected
reductions. By determining the percentage of revenue generated by contributions, Cordes
(2011) calculated the percentage reduction in total revenue caused by the assumed ten
percent loss in contributions. A theoretical ten percent drop in contributions reduced the
revenues of higher education nonprofits 1.4 percent (Cordes, 2011). This measure is an
estimate for a single year inclusive of all types of giving – expendable for current year
operations as well as nonexpendable for endowment building.
One of the few studies specific to university endowments examined theoretical
tax policies and calculated impact if enacted. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) simulated
three proposed tax policies assuming implementation in 1992 and compared the
simulated mean university endowment size to actual mean endowment size in 2010. A
minimum spending rule similar to the rule applicable to private foundations, discussed in
the following section, would increase the average annual payouts from endowments, but
eventually decreases endowment size and subsequent payouts (Milton & Ehrenberg,
2014). A tax on endowments over $1 billion impacts a limited number of institutions.
Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) estimated a 4.8% reduction in endowment size by the end
of the time period with a 2.5% tax. Policies were simulated related directly to charitable
contribution deductions, elimination of all deductions to university endowments and
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reducing deductions to one-half of the contribution. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) found
eliminating or reducing charitable deduction gifts would decrease endowment
distributions by 12.8% at the end of the time period, with the variance between quartiles
ranging from a reduction of 11.5% to a reduction 15.3%. Elimination of the tax deduction
was projected to reduce endowment distributions by 25.7%, with any reduction in the
deduction hurting small-endowed schools the greatest, assuming all donors are in top
marginal tax rate with a tax-price elasticity of -1.0 (Milton & Ehrenberg, 2014).
Policy implications for private foundations.
Private foundations are able to grant a tax benefit to a donor years before the gift
generates a charitable benefit, much like university endowments. Transfer of today’s
wealth to the future’s beneficiaries creates “current charitable contribution deductions to
donors and future virtually tax-exempt investment returns” until ultimately being granted
to a public charity (Sansing & Yetman, 2006, p. 364). This charitable benefit lag is
frequently cited as justification for the minimum distribution requirement for private
foundations. Levine and Sansing (2013) stated the minimum distribution requirement was
a political compromise to the lifespan debate of private foundations – the question of
being permitted to have a perpetual or limited time existence. There is no comparative
advantage, according to Levine and Sansing (2013), to establish a private foundation
instead of providing funding to an existing public charity except for “a desire to retain
control of foundation assets” (p. 167).
Private foundations face more restrictive regulation than public charities. The Tax
Reform Act of 1969 established a minimum distribution requirement and an excise tax on
net investment income for private foundations. Although the tax regulations have been
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amended to reduce the rates, the basic structure is still in effect. Tax law requires private
foundations to disburse a minimum of five percent of the monthly average fair market
value of non-charitable use endowment assets each year. Foundations readily comply
with the required distribution in order to maintain tax-exempt status, but frequently only
distribute an immaterial amount above the minimum required. In a study of private
foundation distributions, Sansing and Yetman (2006) approximated 57% of distributions
were targeted or benchmarked to the minimum required, indicating the majority of
foundations were limiting distribution decisions based on the tax code regulation.
Foundations distributing more than the minimum required tended to be active
foundations that were continuing to receive new donations and experiencing asset growth
(Sansing & Yetman, 2006).
Sansing and Yetman (2006) found most foundations did not manage distributions
for the dual excise tax advantage. Large and professionally managed foundations are
timing distributions to qualify for the reduced tax rate, however those institutions also
had lower five-year average distribution percentages (Sansing & Yetman, 2006).
Congress’ incentive to stimulate spending for charitable purposes creates a disincentive
to distribute funds beyond the minimum required. Sansing and Yetman (2006) concluded
the IRS regulations on distributions are effective on inert foundations but constrain
activity of growing foundations.
Summary.
Impact of tax policy is evaluated by simulations of previously-enacted reform and
proposed reform. Tax regulations imposed on private foundations are informative for
university endowments as similar legislation has been recently enacted. Private, higher
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education institutions with at least 500 tuition-paying students and non-charitable-use
assets of $500,000 per student are now subject to an excise tax of 1.4% on net investment
income (U.S. House, 2017), very similar to the net investment income tax imposed on
private foundations. Theoretical model predications cannot capture all the relevant
variables but, for higher education, research supports the efficacy of the tax-price
elasticity models.

Copyright © Jennifer W. Siebenthaler 2019
54

Chapter 3: Methodology
This chapter introduces the research questions, hypotheses, and methodologies
used for this dissertation. Two research questions are addressed: the first question
examines the overarching impact of tax policy on university endowments and the second
question narrows the application of the findings. The methodology used to answer each
question and the population samples, variables, and sources of the datasets are described.
The final item discussed in this chapter is the identified limitations of the study.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Research question 1: What is the long-run financial impact of a tax policy
proposal that changes the tax price of giving on endowments of higher education
institutions?
Tax price elasticity research theorizes that tax policy proposals affect
contributions to charitable organizations when the tax price of giving is altered, reducing
gifts provided if the price increases. Unlike expendable gifts, a reduction in endowment
contributions has a long-run effect because a gift to an endowment can benefit all
subsequent years. Each year following a contribution, investment income earned on the
original gift is available for spending. Benefits escalate over time in amount, assuming
the value of the original gift continues to grow. It is hypothesized that the financial
impact of the most recent changes enacted in the federal tax code will be minimal to
university endowments initially but grow to material levels over time as the accumulated
effect of lower contributions erodes the wealth base and leads to lower future earnings.
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Research question 2: What institutional characteristics identify institutions with
greater relevance to personal income tax policies measured by higher reliance on
individual giving to university endowments?
University endowments receive contributions from a variety of sources:
individuals including alumni and parents, foundations, corporations, and other
organizations. The tax policy examined in the first research question directly impacts
individuals. Foundations, corporations, and other organizations are subject to their own
tax policies. The results of the first research question will have greater applicability to
institutions with heavier reliance on individual donors to the endowment as compared to
organizational donors. I hypothesize heavier reliance on individual donors to
endowments is correlated with private colleges, non-doctoral universities, lower full-time
equivalent enrollment, fewer Pell Grant recipients, and higher published tuition and fees.
Data Collection
The population of interest includes all public and private colleges and universities,
including affiliated foundations, in the U.S. that hold endowment assets. For-profit higher
education institutions are excluded as charitable contributions are not eligible for tax
deduction and, therefore, would not be subject to a similar impact of personal income tax
policy. Data are drawn from three sources: the CASE Voluntary Support of Education
Survey Data Miner (VSE) database, the NACUBO Survey of Endowments, and the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS). The primary source, the VSE survey, is a voluntary survey
completed by North American educational institutions, including higher education, and
provides variables related to charitable giving and fundraising from private sources
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(CASE, 2019a). Invitations to participate in the survey are mailed and e-mailed to
approximately 3,800 institutions. Any U.S. institution that does not receive an invitation
may request to participate and will be included. CASE (2019a) reports that approximately
one-third of the U.S. colleges and universities respond to the survey and represent close
to 80% of total voluntary support in higher education. Response rates are lowest among
two-year institutions, smaller colleges, and institutions that experienced a weak previous
year. Participation is highest by doctoral universities. NACUBO (2019b) published
annual reports, jointly with the Commonfund Institute from 2009 to 2017 as the
NACUBO-Commonfund Survey of Endowments (NCSE) and with the TIAA beginning
in 2018 as the NTSE. Endowment performance and management practices in higher
education were voluntarily provided by U.S. colleges and universities for the NACUBO
Endowment Study, NCSE, and NTSE (NACUBO, 2019a). Participation size and
composition is similar to the VSE and is completed by on online questionnaire with a
subsequent detailed telephone call interview (NACUBO, 2018). Reporting to IPEDS is
required for all higher education institutions that participate in federal student financial
aid programs and the surveys provide information about institutional characteristics,
outcomes, demographics, and financial data (NCES, 2019a). The IPEDS data include all
intuitions that voluntarily complete the surveys compiled by VSE and NACUBO. Tables
A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix provide reporting institutions by summarized Carnegie
Classification for fiscal year 2017. The NCES and the VSE represent similar populations,
but overrepresent doctoral, master’s, and baccalaureate institutions of the U.S. higher
education population. For institutions reporting endowment balances, the surveys are
more closely aligned but significantly underrepresent two-year and special focus four-
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year colleges. Doctoral universities continue to be overrepresented. Tables A.3 and A.4
reflect institutions reporting endowment balances by institutional control. Private
institutions and larger endowment balances are overrepresented, especially in the NCSE.
I discuss the samples for each research question and study limitations in the subsequent
sections of this chapter.
Research Question 1
Description of method
As documented by Milton and Ehrenberg (2013), endowment values are changed
by more than contributions alone. A loss in contributions in one year has cumulating
effects in subsequent years as earning opportunities are forgone. By inserting the effect of
a tax price change into Milton and Ehrenberg’s endowment growth formula, the financial
impact of the change is estimated over the long-run. Milton and Ehrenberg (2013)
provided the basic relationship of the components similar to the following (slight
adjustments were made to reflect ending endowment balances employed in place of
beginning endowment balances):
7%' = 7%,'8, (1 +

:%'
)(1 + ;%' )(1 − =%' ),
7%,'8,

where:
7%' =

size of institution i’s endowment at the end of period t

:%' =

annual gifts to endowment

;%' =

rate of return on endowment assets

=%' =

endowment spending rate

Endowment growth is achieved by annual gifts to the endowment and the return on the
endowment investment assets. Gifts and return both increase the nonexpendable
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(principal) portion of the endowment and return provides the expendable (earnings)
portion of the endowment. Return can also decrease the nonexpendable portion of the
endowment during economic downturns through losses, both realized and unrealized.
Spending from the endowment decreases the expendable portion of the endowment.
To assert the implications of a change in tax policy, inclusion of a variable to
reflect the estimated decrease in annual giving is needed. The variable reflects the
product of the tax price of giving elasticity and the percentage change in the tax price of
giving. The tax price of giving is 1 – m where m is the marginal tax rate. For donors in
the 25 percent tax bracket, each dollar claimed as a charitable contribution deduction
reduces the tax liability by 25 cents, resulting in a tax price of giving of 75 cents per
dollar donated. Responsiveness to changes in the tax price of giving is measured by the
elasticity – the percentage change in donations resulting from a one percentage change in
the price of giving, all else being equal. Price elasticity of giving is believed to be
negative; an increase in tax price causes a decrease in giving (Clotfelter, 1985). The
composition of the change in contributions variable is expressed as follows:
(,8 @A )8(,8 @B )

>' = ?' (

(,8 @B )

),

where:
>' =

change in contributions in period t

?' =

tax price elasticity of giving in period t

CD =

marginal tax rate pre-implementation of the new tax policy

C, =

marginal tax rate post-implementation of the new tax policy
Without the change in contributions variable, the equation approximates actual

endowment levels for each year. The addition of the variable estimates endowment levels
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for each year assuming a tax policy results in a change to the tax price of giving. The
addition of the new variable results in the following:
7%' = 7%,'8, (1 +

(,EFG )HIG
JI,GKA

)(1 + ;%' )(1 − =%' ).

The coefficient to the annual gifts to endowment variable increases annual gifts in years
of tax price reduction and decreases annual gifts in years of tax price escalations. The
relationships are summarized as follows:
Marginal Tax Rate

Tax Price of Giving

Change in Giving

1 + >'

↓

↑

↓

<1

↑

↓

↑

>1

For an example application of the new coefficient, assume a tax price elasticity,
?' , of

-1.1. If the marginal tax rate pre-implementation of a new tax policy, CD , is 0.35

and post-implementation, C, , is 0.3, there is a 0.077 increase in the tax price. The
product of the increase in tax price and ?' is -0.085, the change in contributions, >' . The
coefficient 1 + >' is now 0.915, reducing annual gifts to endowments, :%' . If the previous
example was a 0.077 decrease in the tax price, >' is calculated as 0.085, the resulting
value for the coefficient 1 + >' is 1.085, and annual gifts are increased. By using data
from a selected time period, the approximate endowment levels at the end of that time
period are compared to the estimates of endowment levels based on an assumed change
in tax price. The difference between the approximation and the estimate is a financial
measure of the impact on higher education endowments. By quantifying the impact, a
measure is developed that encompasses all components generating endowment growth,
not just contributions.
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Variables
The first research question engages five continuous variables in a formula to
predict endowment ending fair market value (FMV). Each of the variables used in the
prediction model is described in the following sections.
Endowment fair market value.
The VSE survey collects the endowment FMV at the end of each fiscal year.
Survey instructions direct participants to include true, term, and quasi-endowment funds
and public institutions to include endowment from affiliated foundations (CASE, 2018).
The variable is identified as the ending FMV for year 0, but also represents the beginning
FMV for year 1. For example, to predict the endowment ending FMV for 2008, the
ending FMV for 2007 is used as the beginning FMV for 2008. While this is the variable
the study attempts to predict, the actual values are used to begin the prediction and to
measure the accuracy of the model.
Charitable contributions to endowment.
Charitable contributions to endowment were extracted from the VSE survey for
each institution and each year of the study. All outright gifts to the endowment for the
specified year are reflected in this variable. Gifts to endowment are added to the corpus
and may be in the form of cash or investments. In either case, the contribution is valued
based on market value on the date of the gift. Variables also provide the subclassification
of income-restricted verses income-unrestricted endowment gifts. Income-restricted gifts
specify purpose, time, or purpose and time requirements on the income generated by the
endowment gift. Income-unrestricted gifts provide the institution discretion in the use of
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income subsequently earned from the endowment gift. No distinction between restricted
and unrestricted endowment gifts is made in this dissertation.
Endowment investment rate of return.
Annual investment return data are not available for each institution, however the
NCSE compiled a summary of the reported one-year return averages, net of fees, each
year and provided an average for each endowment size segment based on the value of the
endowment assets at the end of the year. I use the NCSE reported average rates for the
investment return as determined by the endowment FMV variable for each institution in
each year. The six asset size segments, listed below, were interpreted to round to the
nearest $100,000 applied as follows:
1. Over $1 billion

> $1,000,000,000

2. Between $501 million and $1 billion

$500,500,000 ≤

$1,000,000,000
3. Between $101 million and $500 million

$100,500,000 ≤

$500,499,999
4. Between $51 million and $100 million

$50,500,000 ≤ $100,499,999

5. Between $25 million and $50 million

$25,000,000 ≤ $50,499,999

6. Under $25 million

< $25,000,000

The NACUBO Endowment Study and the NCSE were voluntary and the number
of institutions and the specific participants varied across time. Over the ten-year period
examined in this dissertation, the NACUBO Endowment Study and NCSE samples
averaged 824 institutions and fluctuated from a low in 2005 of 796 to a high of 850 in
2010 (NACUBO, 2019b). Lerner et al. (2008) noted the data in the Endowment Study
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tended to be from larger and more selective universities and were more likely to be
private institutions. A strength in the data noted by Brown et al. (2010) is that the
institutions included in the sample were not added or removed for any previous years’
results which eliminated survivorship or self-selection bias. Barber and Wang (2013)
quantitatively supported the theory that survivorship bias is not a concern due to the
longevity of educational institutions and their endowments. This dissertation’s sample
includes the same 648 institutions across all years. The 2017 NCSE had a slightly larger
sample of 809 U.S. higher education institutions and included 484 (74.7%) institutions of
this dissertation’s sample. Table 3.1 summarizes and compares the frequency of
institutions and distribution of endowment FMVs by ten-year average endowment size
segments for each sample. Table 3.2 summarizes and compares the frequency of
institutions and distribution of endowment FMV by institutional control for each sample
for the last five years of the study, the only years available for the published NCSE. The
endowment FMVs in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 have not been inflation-adjusted to maintain
consistent grouping with assigned rates of return. The similarity of the samples’
compositions supports the application of the NCSE reported average rates to this
dissertation.
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Table 3.1
Frequency Distribution and Endowment FMV of Institutions, Ten-year average (200817)
Endowment Dissertation
Dissertation
NACUBO/NCSE
NACUBO/NCSE
FMV
Sample
Sample
Sample
Sample
($ in
Frequency
Endowment
Endowment FMV
Frequency (%)
billions)
(%)
FMV (%)
(%)
Over
$1

71 (11.0)

78 (9.5)

$309.0 (75.6)

$321.3 (72.0)

$.5 to
≤ $1

59 (9.1)

71 (8.6)

$43.1 (10.6)

$49.5 (11.1)

$.1 to
≤ $.5

179 (27.6)

250 (30.3)

$42.9 (10.5)

$57.0 (12.8)

$.05 to
≤ $.1

115 (17.7)

164 (19.9)

$8.4 (2.0)

$11.9 (2.7)

$.025
to
≤ $.05

101 (15.6)

128 (15.6)

$3.9 (0.9)

$4.7 (1.0)

Under
$.025

123 (19.0)

133 (16.1)

$1.6 (0.4)

$1.9 (0.4)

Table 3.2
Frequency Distribution and Endowment FMV of Institutions, Five-year average (201317)
Dissertation
Institutional
Dissertation
NCSE Sample
NCSE Sample
Sample
Control
Sample
Endowment
Frequency (%) Endowment
($ in billions) Frequency (%)
FMV (%)
FMV (%)
Private
340 (52.5)
517 (63.2)
$324 (71.2)
$352 (68.3)
Public
308 (47.5)
301 (36.8)
$131 (28.8)
$163 (31.7)
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Endowment spending rate.
Identical to the endowment investment rate of return noted in the previous
section, the annual endowment spending rate data are also not available for each
institution but were compiled and reported by endowment size segments by the NCSE.
The reported average annual effective spending rates were defined by NACUBO (2018)
as:
The distribution for spending divided by the beginning market value (endowment
value on or around the beginning of the fiscal year), net of any fees or expenses
for managing and administering the endowment. The distribution for spending is
the dollar amount withdrawn from the endowment to support the institution’s
mission. (p. 120)
This dissertation uses the NCSE reported average rates for the endowment spending rate
as determined by the endowment FMV variable for each year and institution. Refer to the
prior section for supporting analysis of applicability to this study’s sample.
Change in contributions.
Determination of the change in contributions requires calculation of the change in
the tax price of giving and identification of the tax price elasticity. The TCJA enacted
several provisions that indirectly impact the tax benefit of giving, complicating the
identification of a single change in the tax price. Chapter one outlines the key provisions
that reduce the tax price of giving through two primary effects: decrease in the number of
tax return filers electing to itemize deductions (itemizers) and decrease in the marginal
tax rates. The change in the tax price of giving is determined by the categorization of the
donor:
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•

Non-itemizer or non-filer who was previously a non-itemizer or non-filer.
Non-itemizers and non-filers receive no tax benefit from charitable
contributions. Without a tax deduction, the tax price of giving is equal to
contribution, or 100%. By remaining a non-itemizer or non-filer, these
donors have no change in their tax price of giving.

•

Itemizer who was previously a non-itemizer or non-filer. This group is the
only cohort that experiences a decrease in the tax price of giving with the
TCJA, moving from a 100% tax price to a tax price of 100% less the
marginal tax rate. This population is projected to be very small.

•

Non-itemizer or non-filer who was previously an itemizer. Shifting from
receiving a tax benefit for contributions to receiving no tax benefit
increases the tax price of giving to 100%. The increase in the size of the
standard deduction and the loss of various itemized deduction
opportunities will result in a large population for this category. The change
in the tax price of giving depends on the marginal tax rate applicable with
the tax benefit received, which varies based on taxable income.

•

Itemizer who was previously an itemizer. Most donors who continue to
itemize will experience a slight increase in the tax price of giving with the
enactment of lower marginal rates. The change in the tax price of giving
depends on the change in the marginal tax rates.

Think tanks American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and Urban-Brookings Tax Policy
Center (TPC) separately published projections of the impact the TCJA will have on
charitable donations utilizing microsimulation models. AEI and TPC used slightly
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different approaches but predicted relatively similar decreases in giving, 4% by AEI and
5% by TPC (Brill & Choe, 2018; Gleckman, 2018). Both studies found the most
significant change will be in the reduction in itemizers with less impact from the
reduction in marginal tax rates. The TPC estimated 21 million (56.7%) households will
stop itemizing and AEI estimated a slightly higher 27.3 million (Brill & Choe, 2018;
Gleckman, 2018). The AEI study calculated 83% of the expected decrease in giving will
be due to the increase in the standard deduction and the remaining 17% will be due to the
lower marginal tax rates (Brill & Choe, 2018).
The AEI study employs the IUPUI Lilly Family School of Philanthropy Giving
USA (Giving USA) study to integrate non-itemizer giving data with tax filer data and
notes “the bulk of charitable giving is driven by high-income individuals” (Brill & Choe,
2018, p. 4). Prior to TCJA enactment, individual giving was projected to be $296 billion
in 2018, based on 2017 giving and 3.2% annual growth (Brill & Choe, 2018; Giving
USA, 2018). AEI used the Open Source Policy Center’s Tax-Calculator release 0.20.1 to
simulate giving by itemizers with no tax law changes and assumed the understatement as
compared to the Giving USA projection was due to non-itemizer giving (Brill & Choe,
2018). AEI also simulated itemizer giving with the tax law changes, assuming a tax-price
elasticity of -1.0 and an income elasticity of 1.0 (Brill & Choe, 2018). AEI determined
the TCJA will increase the average tax price of giving for top deciles of taxpayers but
have little to no impact for taxpayers with adjusted gross income below the median. AEI
estimated a weighted-average change in the tax price of giving as a 4% increase in a
static model and a slightly lower increase of 3.85% in a dynamic model that assumes a
0.3% growth in GDP (Brill & Choe, 2018).
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TPC (2018) used their Microsimulation Model version 0217-1 to estimate the tax
benefit of charitable deductions with and without the TCJA enactment. The tax benefit
was calculated by projecting the number of tax filers with a charitable contribution by
income class and multiplying the projection by the average tax benefit per income class
bracket. The marginal tax rates will primarily impact high-income givers who provide the
largest proportion of gifts measured by dollars. In a previous simulation, TPC (2017)
used Microsimulation Model version 0718-1 and estimated non-itemizers, while making
up 90% of tax return filers, contributed 40% of all giving and the remaining 10% of filers
were itemizers who contributed 60% of all giving. TPC (2017) estimated the overall tax
price of giving will increase from 79.3 cents to 84.8 cents, a weighted-average increase of
6.94%.
Based on the average of the AEI and TPC microsimulation findings, I employ a
constant 4.5% decrease for the annual percentage change in contribution variable. The
AEI is recognized as a conservative think tank and the TPC, while labeled as nonpartisan,
is a joint project between two think tanks that have been viewed as left-leaning. With the
different methodological approaches and potentially conflicting perspectives, the
relatively consistent findings provide wider acceptance of the predicted change in
contributions.
Categorical variables.
Variables are used to categorize data for more precise analysis: endowment size
quartile, relative contribution quartile, and control of institution. All monetary variables
are inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollar values (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019). Two
measures of endowment size are used for classification, total endowment FMV and
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endowment FMV per student. Endowment size quartile based on total FMV is derived by
calculating the ten-year average of the inflation-adjusted ending endowment FMVs for
2008 to 2017. Endowment size quartile based on endowment FMV per student is derived
by using the ten-year average of the inflation-adjusted ending endowment FMVs and the
ten-year average of full-time equivalent (FTE) student enrollment. The FTE enrollment
variable is calculated by IPEDS using fall student headcounts reported by the institution
for both undergraduate and graduate students. The calculation converts part-time students
into fractions of full-time students and combines the two for a total FTE headcount.
Conversion rates vary based on the institutional control; a part-time undergraduate is
equivalent to 0.403543 FTE and a part-time graduate is equivalent to 0.361702 FTE at a
four-year public institution, 0.392857 FTE undergraduate and 0.382059 FTE graduate at
a four-year private institution, and 0.335737 FTE undergraduate at a two-year public
institution (NCES, 2019b). For this study, each institution was then identified as
belonging to quartiles based on the calculated average and ratio. NACUBO (2019a) noted
higher dollar-value endowments tended to have higher average spending rates over the
last decade. Milton and Ehrenberg (2014) found the long-run impact of eliminating or
reducing charitable contribution deductions would impair lower-endowed schools the
greatest. A categorical variable to reflect relative contribution levels was derived by
combining total contributions to endowments over the ten-year period, inflation-adjusted
to 2017 dollar value, and calculating this total as a percentage of the 2017 endowment
FMV. The categorical variable is based on the quartile of this measure. Quartile one
represents institutions with low percentages of contributions to endowment assets. The
organizational characteristic control of institution classifies each college and university as
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either a two-year public, four-year public, or private entity. According to NACUBO
(2019a), public institutions historically averaged lower effective spending rates than
private institutions.
Analysis
Sample selection and data cleaning.
The population of interest for the first research question encompasses all public
and private, not-for-profit colleges and universities, including affiliated foundations, in
the U.S. that hold endowments. The initial sample for this study was from the VSE
database and included 1,343 U.S. higher education institutions reporting endowment
balances during fiscal years 2007 to 2017. The longitudinal study necessitates all
variables reported for each of the years in the study. Institutions missing at least one year
of endowment data were removed, eliminating 673 colleges and universities. Two
institutions were removed due to inconsistency in reporting as combined or separate
between years and databases (Moravian College and Moravian Seminary). A third
institution (Salisbury University) was removed for reporting a negative gift in 2008.
While there is the possibility that a gift may have been returned or a correction was made
for misapplying the gift to the endowment, the negative gift is not consistent with the
reporting in IPEDS and is potentially an erroneous entry. West Kentucky Community and
Technical College reported an unusual series of gifts and balances from 2015 to 2017.
The institution reported endowment ending FMV balances around $300,000 for each of
the years. However, contributions to endowment of approximately $655,000 were
reported in 2016 without the expected subsequent increase in endowment balance. An
inquiry with Kay Yates (personal communication, July 8, 2019), the System Director of
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Development of the Kentucky Community and Technical College System (KCTCS),
uncovered an error in the reporting. KCTCS holds an endowment for all sixteen colleges
in the system. West Kentucky Community and Technical College and other individual
institutions in the system also hold endowments with foundations. The endowment
information provided annually to VSE reported only the FMV for the KCTCS
endowment but both the KCTCS and Foundation endowment contributions (K. Yates,
personal communication, July 8, 2019). The comparison is not an apples verses oranges
analogy, but more like comparing apples and apple pie. Fourteen of the KCTCS entities
hold foundation endowments and were removed from the sample due to the
understatement of endowment balances. An additional five institutions (Columbia State
Community College, Mansfield University, Rockland Community College, Schenectady
County Community College, and Wake Technical Community College) reported unusual
endowment balance trends that were not consistent with the balance reporting in IPEDS
and were removed from the sample. The final sample consisted of 648 institutions.
A panel dataset was created from the three sources (VSE, NACUBO Endowment
Study/NTSE, and IPEDS) for fiscal years 2008 to 2017. Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the
Appendix provide comparisons of institutions in the full population of higher education
endowments, the sample for each survey source, and my sample for the first research
question. The sample distribution by institutional control aligns with the population,
however two-year institutions, special focus four-year institutions, and endowments with
lower balances are underrepresented. The sample composition is addressed in the
discussion of limitations.
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Model development.
The basic model, 7%' = 7%,'8, (1 +

HIG
JI,GKA

)(1 + ;%' )(1 − =%' ), was run with the

dataset to test the accuracy of estimating actual FMV of 7%' . Modifications were then
made to compensate for the spending rate variable. The NCSE annual reports provide the
effective spending rate calculated based on beginning endowment FMV. The basic model
overestimates disbursements from the endowment by applying the spending rate to the
endowment corpus, current year gifts, and current year return. The formula modification
applies the spending rate to only the corpus and applies the return rate to both the
beginning endowment FMV, net of spending, and new gifts. With the spending rate
modification, the model was again run with the dataset and compared to the actual
endowment FMVs. The results illustrated in Figure 1 demonstrate the strength of the
annual estimation model as modified but prior to inclusion of a measurement error.
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Figure 1. Average ending endowment FMV, actual and estimated, by fiscal year-end.
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The next modification was to include a measurement error variable. Estimation of
two variables, rate of return and spending rate, generate measurement error. A
comparison of the actual ending FMV to the model’s estimated ending FMV was used to
determine the annual measurement error for each institution. The average measurement
error across all institutions for all years is an underestimate of 0.0059. The average
absolute value of the measurement error is higher, 0.0491. The use of the NTSE samples’
average spending and return rates based on endowment size does not capture differences
in those variables based on individual institutional factors such as control or strategy. As
previously noted, public institutions historically averaged lower effective spending rates
than private institutions and the measurement error adjusts for those differences along
with variances for rate of return. Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics for the
absolute value of measurement error by institutional control. The measurement error is
slightly larger for the public institutions, significantly so for two-year publics, than the
private entities. Further analysis of the measurement error produced the same pattern
based on institutional control within each larger endowment size segments, but the
reverse for the two smallest size segments. This trend reflects the composition of each
size segment with the larger segments dominated by private institutions and the smaller
segments dominated by public institutions. The NACUBO/NCSE samples, as noted in
Table 3.2, were nearly two-thirds private institutions, leading to more accurate
representation of the private institution rates of return and spending in the averages. The
average across each of the institutional control categories decreased from the smallest to
the largest size sectors. While the variable is inversely related to the endowment size, the
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difference in average measurement error by institutional control remained consistent
across the size segments.
Table 3.3
Descriptive Statistics for the Absolute Value of Measurement Error, by Institutional
Control (2008-17)
Institutional
Control

Obs.

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Private,
not-for-profit

3,400

0.0439

0.0615

0.0000

1.0221

Public,
4-year

2,640

0.0504

0.0681

0.0000

0.8874

Public,
2-year

440

0.0816

0.1219

0.0000

0.9573

6,480

0.0491

0.0705

0.0000

1.0221

All

Positive measurement errors reflect the model underestimated an endowment’s
,

ending FMV and a negative represents an overestimate. The function ,8 L adjusts the
I,M

estimate accordingly. If there is no measurement error, the 6%,N term equals zero and the
function is one. If the model underestimates, the 6%,N term is positive, and the function is
greater than one, increasing the estimate. If the model overestimates, the 6%,N term is
negative, and the function is less than one, reducing the estimate. The final modified
model is as follows:
,

7%' = [7%,'8, (1 − =%' ) + :%' (1 − >' )](1 + ;%' )(,8 L ).
I,M

The selected time period is the ten-year span from 2008 to 2017. Individual
marginal tax rate brackets were relatively stable in this timeframe. Tax rate schedules are
indexed for inflation to prevent migration to higher brackets. For 2013, a new tax bracket
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was added for the highest taxable income bracket, $400,000 and higher, with a 39.6% tax
rate. Table 3.4 reviews the number of tax returns with, and dollar value of, charitable
deductions claimed in each available tax year by adjusted gross income categories. The
percentage of tax returns claiming a charitable contribution itemized deduction by
adjusted gross income category was consistent throughout the observed years, especially
for the highest bracket. The distribution of charitable deduction dollar values experienced
slight fluctuations but was consistent across the period considering the Great Recession
experienced around tax year 2009. No other significant variations are noted that would
cause concern for using 2008-17 in this study.
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Table 3.4
Charitable Contribution Itemized Deduction Tax Filer Frequency and Charitable
Contribution Distribution by Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) and Tax Year
Under
$20,000 <
$75,000 <
Tax Year
$200,000 +
$20,000
$75,000
$200,000
1,921 (3.9)
15,838 (25.0)
17,579 (68.7)
3,912 (89.4)
2008
$3,051 (1.8) $37,054 (21.4)
$60,493 (35.0)
$72,337 (41.8)
1,976 (4.0)
14,986 (24.0)
16,754 (67.1)
3,527 (89.9)
2009
$3,362 (2.1) $35,862 (22.7)
$59,680 (37.8)
$59,112 (37.4)
1,938 (3.9)
15,028 (23.7)
17,321 (67.1)
3,856 (89.7)
2010
$3,244 (1.9) $36,627 (21.5)
$61,293 (36.0)
$69,072 (40.6)
1,842 (3.7)
14,201 (22.3)
17,559 (65.8)
4,188 (89.1)
2011
$3,011 (1.7) $35,287 (20.2)
$63,085 (36.2)
$73,091 (41.9)
1,674 (3.4)
13,473 (21.3)
17,602 (63.4)
4,617 (87.9)
2012
$2,832 (1.4) $35,009 (17.6)
$64,600 (32.4)
$96,830 (48.6)
1,560 (3.2)
12,512 (19.6)
17,553 (60.5)
4,806 (86.5)
2013
$2,661 (1.4) $33,904 (17.4)
$67,112 (34.5)
$90,987 (46.7)
1,349 (2.8)
11,739 (18.2)
17,784 (58.6)
5,349 (85.9)
2014
$2,262 (1.1) $32,503 (15.4)
$68,847 (32.7)
$106,985 (50.8)
1,403 (3.0)
11,357 (17.4)
18,058 (57.6)
5,805 (86.0)
2015
$2,497 (1.1) $32,830 (14.8)
$71,819 (32.4)
$114,705 (51.7)
1,395 (3.0)
11,446 (17.4)
18,178 (57.1)
5,917 (85.8)
2016
$2,460 (1.1) $33,999 (14.5)
$73,056 (31.2)
$124,352 (53.2)
1,314 (3.0)
11,032 (17.0)
18,123 (55.6)
6,381 (85.3)
2017
$2,469 (1.0) $33,438 (14.1)
$75,185 (31.6)
$126,968 (53.3)
Notes: Number of tax returns with charitable contribution itemized deduction, in
thousands, and as a percentage of all tax returns in the AGI bracket. Charitable
deductions claimed, in millions, and as a percentage of total charitable deductions for all
returns.
Source: Compiled from IRS Statistics of Income Division, Source of Income files.

Descriptive statistics.
Descriptive statistics were generated for the continuous variables in the estimation
model. Due to skewness of two variables, endowment FMV and contributions to
endowment, the median is reported along with the mean, standard deviation, minimum,
and maximum. In addition to the descriptive statistics for all institutions in each year,
statistics are reported for ten-year averages by endowment size quartile and institutional
control. The mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are provided for the
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annual return rate, spending rate, and measurement error. Descriptive statistics are also
provided for the ten-year average combined rates of return, spending, and measurement
error as the lack of institution-specific measures prevent an informative analysis on the
individual variables. Frequency counts are provided by institutional control and
trendlines for the growth components are presented. Two additional categorical measures
were created to further analyze endowment and contribution sizes, ten-year average
endowment FMV per ten-year average FTE student enrollment and ten-year endowment
contributions as a percentage of 2017 endowment FMV. Descriptive statistics are
presented for each of these variables for the full sample and by quartiles, institutional
control, and total endowment size.
Analysis.
The final modified model was run on the panel dataset to predict the ending
endowment FMV ten years post-implementation as if the TCJA was enacted as of fiscal
year 2008. Descriptive statistics were compared for the predicted and actual ending
endowment FMV for the tenth year, 2017. Comparative trend lines over the ten-year
period were also generated. The analysis was performed for the subsectors of the data
based on institutional control, endowment size, and contributions to the endowment as a
percentage of the 2017 endowment balance. The model is designed to reduce
contributions by a constant 4.5% and replicate the same rate of return and rate of
spending that each institution annually experienced. The return and spending dollar
values are impacted by the base of the endowment, the ending FMV of assets. The base is
increased by 95.5% of contributions and, therefore, the return and spending are changed
proportionally across all institutions each year. The measurement error compensates for

77

institutional differences in the return and spending rates, preventing the decoupling of the
two variables. For these reasons, analysis on the return and spending variables do not
provide discriminatory data.
Research Question 2
Description of method
The first research question seeks to measure impact to endowment wealth from a
change in tax policy expected to reduce charitable contributions. In the second question I
extend the findings by identifying the institutional and endowment characteristics
correlated with greater proportions of endowment gifts that are donated by individuals,
thus more susceptible to the expected impact. The intent is not to determine a causal
relationship but identify characteristic patterns that indicate larger proportions of
individual giving to endowments and, thus, greater concern with personal income tax
policy related to charitable contributions. A cross-section dataset is used to estimate a
model using ordinary least squares regression. The dataset includes the annual
contributions to each institution’s endowment by source, enabling inference of
endowments with high reliance on giving from individuals as opposed to corporations,
foundations, or other organizations. In the following section I further describe the
variables used in the analysis.
Variables
The second research question employs regression analysis with the proportion of
contributions from individuals as the dependent variable. Seven independent variables are
considered in the analysis including institutional control, Carnegie classification,
inclusion of a hospital, student enrollment in the fall semester of the academic year,
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percentage of undergraduate students awarded Pell Grants, published tuition and fees,
and endowment size measured by FMV. Each of the variables used in the analysis is
described in the following sections.
Dependent variable.
Proportion of endowment contributions from individuals.
The dependent variable, endowment contributions from individuals, is derived
from variables extracted from the VSE survey and calculated as a proportion of all giving
to endowments. Charitable contributions to endowments are reported for each institution
and the data include contributions to endowment by source (donor type) as follows:
alumni, parents, other individuals, corporations, foundations, fundraising consortia,
religious organizations, and other organizations. Three variables – alumni, parents, and
other individuals – represent giving from individual donors. CASE (2018) defines alumni
as former students who earned credit toward an offered degree, certificate, or diploma.
The alumni label has precedence over any other donor source category. Parents include
grandparents and guardians of current and former students. Other individuals include
board members, employees, and any persons not otherwise considered alumni or parents.
While giving influenced by personal tax policies could be funneled through one or
more of the remaining variables, there is no ability to distinguish that type of giving. One
example is the donor advised fund (DAF) currently captured within other organizations.
DAFs allow individuals to contribute tax-deductible gifts to an intermediary and
subsequently advise the fund to distribute the gift to charitable entities. Ultimately the
decision to give to the charitable entity belongs to the intermediary as the donor releases
all rights upon giving to the DAF. CASE (2019a) reported giving to universities, not just
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endowments, through a DAF increased 65.8% in dollar value and 18.8% in number of
donors between 2017 and 2018, most likely in response to the TCJA. The sharp increase
in giving through DAFs began subsequent to the time period examined in this
dissertation. The preponderance of giving from individuals is captured in the three
identified categories reflected in the derived variable. The proportion from individuals
was calculated from the sum of total endowment gifts and multiplied by 100 to state the
variable as a percentage of total endowment giving with possible outcomes between zero
and 100.
Independent variables.
Institutional control
IPEDS classifies institutional control as public, private not-for-profit, or private
for-profit. For-profit institutions are excluded from this study as contributions to these
entities are not eligible for tax deduction and, therefore, would not be impacted by
individual income tax policy changes in the same manner as public and private not-forprofit institutions. Public universities are supported through public funds and
administered by elected or appointed officials. Private not-for-profit institutions do not
receive state appropriations and are primarily supported through private sources. Terry
and Macy (2007) found giving is correlated with the private institution structure. State
appropriations have been negatively correlated with giving from both alumni and all
sources except corporations (Leslie & Ramey, 1988; Liu, 2006). A dummy variable was
created to denote private institutions.
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Carnegie classification.
The Carnegie classification, originally published in 1973, is regularly updated and
provides a widely-accepted framework to classify U.S. higher education institutions
(NCES, 2019b). Institutions are categorized into broad groups based on degrees
conferred and further subdivided based on other variables. I use the Carnegie
Classification 2015: Basic variable extracted from IPEDS which provides the following
broad groupings: Doctoral, Master’s, Baccalaureate, Associate’s, Special Focus, and
Tribal College (NCES, 2019b). The latter two groups are carved out from the former
groupings. The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (n.d.) further
subdivides the Doctoral group by the quantitative level of research, measured by research
expenditures and staffing, as highest, higher, or moderate research activity. The Master’s
and Baccalaureate groupings are subdivided by the number of degrees conferred and
programs offered. The Associate’s groupings are subdivided by the disciplinary focus and
primary student demographic. The Special Focus group is categorized by the length or
program and field of specialization; the Tribal College group is not subdivided. The
frequency distribution by Carnegie classification is presented in Tables A.1 and A.2 of
the Appendix. Liu (2006) found doctoral and research universities receive more gifts
from corporations and foundations. Dummy variables were created to denote each of the
broad groups based on the Carnegie classifications. The sample does not include any
tribal colleges; therefore, no dummy variable was created for that category.
Inclusion of hospital
Hospitals alter the dynamics of an institution’s infrastructure, increase the entity’s
exposure to the community, provide additional partnership opportunities, and shift the
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financial reporting snapshot through additional revenues and expenditures. Institutions
were identified by NCES as having a hospital based on financial variables reported in the
IPEDS survey. Institutions are deemed to have a hospital if revenue or expenses from
hospital services are reported. Revenues and expenses are reported for hospitals operated
by and reported as a part of the institution (NCES, 2019b). A dummy variable was
created to denote institutions with hospitals.
Student enrollment.
The FTE enrollment variable is calculated by IPEDS using fall undergraduate and
graduate student headcounts reported by the institution and provides a measure of
institutional size. The calculation converts part-time students into fractions of full-time
students and combines the two for a total FTE headcount. Conversion rates vary based on
the institutional control; a part-time undergraduate is equivalent to 0.403543 FTE and a
part-time graduate is equivalent to 0.361702 FTE at a four-year public institution,
0.392857 FTE undergraduate and 0.382059 FTE graduate at a four-year private
institution, and 0.335737 FTE undergraduate at a two-year public institution (NCES,
2019b). Research on giving to colleges and universities centers on giving from alumni
and what drives alumni to donate. Based on a compilation of the source data reported to
CASE over the twelve years ended in 2018, the alumni category averages 36% of all
endowment gifts. While the size of the student body does not indicate demographic
characteristics, the number of potential alumni may be informative. Liu (2006) found
institutional size, when measured by FTE students, increases alumni giving.
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Pell Grant awards
Undergraduate students with significant financial need may be awarded a Federal
Pell Grant to cover the cost of attendance. Grants, in most cases, are not required to be
repaid, unlike student loans. Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) correlated institutions
with higher levels of need-based aid with alumni giving, however Clotfelter found
individual alumni receiving need-based aid were less likely to subsequently give. Higher
percentages of Pell Grant recipients have been found to be negatively correlated with
alumni giving (Terry & Macy, 2007). Institutions report the percentage of undergraduate
students awarded Pell Grant aid (NCES, 2019b). The variable is stated as a percentage of
enrollment with possible outcomes between zero and 100.
Published tuition and fees.
The published tuition and fees variable is reported by each institution. According
to the IPEDS glossary, the variable is the published cost of tuition and fees for one
academic year for full-time, first-time undergraduate students (NCES, 2019b). The firsttime undergraduate rate is the base-level tuition. Many institutions charge tuition and fees
based on credit-hours earned, with higher rates on upper-division courses and graduate
programs. Public universities have differential tuition based on residency. While there is
no difference for privates, both in-state and out-of-state published rates are considered.
Out-of-state tuition and fees are higher and more comparable to private school tuition.
The published rate does not represent the average tuition and fees paid by students as
many schools, especially private colleges, have high discount rates. Students also receive
financial aid and student loans from internal and external sources to cover the cost of
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attendance. In-state tuition is reported to be positively associated with alumni giving but
negatively associated with giving from all other sources (Liu, 2006).
Endowment size.
The VSE survey collects the endowment FMV at the end of each fiscal year.
Survey instructions direct participants to include true, term, and quasi-endowment funds
and public institutions to include endowment from affiliated foundations (CASE, 2018).
Higher levels of endowment wealth are associated with higher levels of giving from
alumni, specifically, and all sources generally (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2003; Terry & Macy,
2007). Cunningham and Cochi-Ficano (2002) found higher endowment per student
significantly increased subsequent alumni giving and Leslie and Ramey (1988) found
endowment per alumnus was positively correlated to non-alumni giving. However,
Harrison et al. (1995) reported endowment size did not have predictive value on alumni
giving. The variable represents the ending FMV for fiscal year 2017 and is used to
measure endowment size independent of institution size.
Analysis
Sample selection and data cleaning.
The population of interest for the second research question includes all public and
private, not-for-profit colleges and universities, including affiliated foundations, in the
U.S. that hold endowments. The initial sample for this study was from the VSE database
and included 941 U.S. higher education institutions reporting endowment balances during
fiscal year 2017. Institutions without gifts to endowment in fiscal year 2017 were
removed, eliminating 41 colleges and universities. An additional 236 institutions that did
not report gifts by source and 2 institutions that reported total gifts to endowment that do
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not match the sum of reported gifts by source were removed. Three institutions were
removed due to inconsistency in reporting as combined or separate between databases
(Linfield College, Moravian College, and Moravian Seminary). Only partial IPEDS data
was available for 21 colleges and universities and were removed due to incomplete
variables. Thirteen KCTCS institutions removed in research question one due to
underreported endowment balances were removed for the same reason. One of the
KCTCS institutions removed in research question one was previously eliminated for
research question two as there were no endowment gifts reported for fiscal year 2017.
Two of the five institutions that were discovered in research question one to report
unusual endowment balance trends not consistent with the balance reporting in IPEDS,
Columbia State Community College and Mansfield University, were also removed from
the sample. The remaining three were previously removed due to no reported endowment
gifts for fiscal year 2017. The continuous variables were tested for normality and were
found to exhibit skewness. Numerous transformations were attempted on the variables
exhibiting skewness. Log-transformation provides a normal distribution for student
enrollment, percentage of Pell Grants, and endowment size. The in-state tuition and fees
variable is bi-modal and highly correlated with institutional control. The out-of-state
tuition and fees variable, however, is normally distributed and not as highly correlated
with institutional control. The final sample consisted of 623 institutions. A crosssectional dataset was created from the two sources, VSE and IPEDS, for fiscal year 2017.
Tables A.2, A.3, and A.4 in the Appendix provide comparisons of institutions in
the full population of higher education endowments, the sample for each survey source,
and my sample for the second research question. The sample distribution by institutional
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control aligns with the population, however two-year institutions, special focus four-year
institutions, and endowments with lower balances are underrepresented. The sample
composition is addressed in the discussion of limitations. The referenced tables in the
Appendix also provide a comparison of the samples between the research questions,
indicating a consistent distribution by institutional control, endowment size, and Carnegie
Classification groupings. The use of data from the 2017 fiscal year (July 2016 to June
2017) represents the most recent period without the enactment, or full understanding of,
the TCJA. Once taxpayers realized, in late calendar year 2017, the certainty of the TCJA
enactment, behaviors may have altered to either anticipate the impending new tax
advantages or compensate for impending disadvantages. The dataset used represents a
period of habitual behavior as tax policy had not substantially modified charitable
contribution structures in recent history. (Habit persistence regarding giving and tax
policy is discussed by Broman (1989), Barrett (1991), and Barrett et al. (1997), but was
first estimated by Clotfelter (as cited in Barrett et al, 1997, p. 322).)
Descriptive statistics.
Descriptive statistics were generated for the continuous variables. For reader ease,
the non-transformed variables are reported in these statistics. The median is reported, due
to skewness of the variables, along with the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and
maximum. A frequency matrix is presented for the categorical variables. In addition to
the full-sample statistics for all variables, medians and interquartile ranges are reported
for each continuous variable by categorical variable.
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Analysis.
An ordinary least squares regression model is estimated with the 2017 dataset. As
noted, the intent is not to determine a causal relationship, but identify characteristic
patterns that indicate larger proportions of individual giving to endowments and greater
concern with personal income tax policy related to charitable contributions. Bivariate
linear regression is first considered for each variable and correlation between the
independent variables is examined. Multivariate regression is used to test various models
with the relevant independent variables.
Limitations
There are limitations and weaknesses to this study. The study assumes higher
education institutions will not alter behaviors or policies due to the new tax policy or the
consequences of the new tax policy. In reality, institutions may adjust spending from
endowments, modify investment policies, or take other steps to combat an expected
reduction in contributions. This would not be a significant concern if the study was
confined to a short time period, but the long-run view may overestimate the impact as the
time horizon provides ample reaction time. The use of historical data reflects these types
of adjustments but can also be viewed as a weakness. While markets, donors, and
administrators will not exactly replicate reactions to various economic environments, the
historical data provided observed reactions from multiple points of time and
combinations of factors. For example, an economic downturn and fall in market values
may result in reduced contributions from donors and management-induced changes in
spending from endowments. Decisions of that nature are reflected in the historical data.
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However, there is no control over the numerous factors that influenced the realized
outcomes.
Two additional sets of challenges surround identification of the percentage change
in contributions variable. The first limitation is the treatment of all giving sources as
individuals even though non-individual donors do not have the same tax incentives for
giving. The VSE data reveals the majority of giving to endowments does come from
individuals. Averaging giving from 2008-17, 61.3% of endowment gifts were from
alumni, parents, and other individuals (CASE, 2019b). The next largest group is
foundations with 25.9% and the remaining 12.8% is from corporations (7.3%), other
organizations (5.3%), and fundraising consortia (0.2%) (CASE, 2019b). These
percentages are consistent with the 2017 data and comparable to all giving reported by
Giving USA. For calendar year 2017, Giving USA (2018) reported 79% of all
contributions were from individuals, 16% from foundations, and 5% from corporations.
Gifts from foundations, fundraising consortia, and other nongovernmental organizations
are arguably indirectly from individual donors. Contributions from these sources are
potentially impacted by the individual tax policy with a delayed reaction. Giving USA
(2018) reported 9% of all contributions in 2017 were from bequests, an estimated $36.9
billion. The IRS (n.d.) summary of income files estimated $21 billion in charitable
deductions were claimed on estate returns for the 2017 tax year. For the period 2008 to
2016, deductions claimed on estate returns were, on average, 7.8% of charitable
deductions claimed by individuals and estates (IRS, n.d.). While estates and corporations
have tax incentives for charitable deductions, the tax policies are not identical to the
individual tax policies.
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The second limitation of the change in contributions variable is the selection of
the tax price elasticity used in the referenced microsimulations. While the empirical
research on tax price elasticity is vast, there is little consensus on precise measurements
for specific groups of taxpayers or charitable causes. This study’s aim is to focus on a
very specific charitable cause for a particular type of nonprofit organization type, which
may have a unique donor profile. The empirical research on the characteristics that may
profile an endowment donor are limited, inconclusive, or contradictory in many cases.
Contradictory studies find that high-income groups are more elastic than lower-income
groups (Auten et al., 1992), less elastic than lower-income groups (Greenwood, as cited
by Lin & Lo, 2012, p. 549), and similar in elasticity to all other income groups (Bakija &
Heim, 2011). Elasticity based on net worth does not indicate variance between groups
(Peloza & Steel, 2005), but there is difficulty in identifying a reliable proxy for net worth
in tax-file data research. Research finds donors of large gifts are price inelastic (Lin &
Lo, 2012), but also that donors to education are price elastic (Duquette, 2016; Yetman &
Yetman, 2013). The limited research available on price elasticity of bequests supports
greater elasticity as compared to the average elasticity of inter-vivos gifts (Peloza &
Steel, 2005). In addition to varying by donor, tax price elasticity may also vary across
time by a lagging reaction to changes. Barrett (1991) finds donors time gifts in
anticipation of tax price changes, increase giving prior to an increase in price, and delay
giving in response to a decrease in price. Donors adjust to a new level of giving within
two years (Barrett et al., 1997; Broman, 1989). Without greater consensus about the
profile and tax behaviors of donors to endowments, the assumptions regarding tax price
elasticity of giving can misrepresent impact.
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In an effort to identify the institutional endowments most susceptible to the
projected impact of individual tax policies, the study builds on foundational research
focused on individual giving motivations. This study examines institutional and
endowment characteristics, but the findings may be biased by omitted observations and
variables. The availability of data and structure of the first research question (requiring
ten consecutive years of reporting) likely drove the sample to be biased with institutions
possessing both the financial and human resources to respond to the VSE and NACUBO
surveys. While the reliance of individual giving on endowments may be correlated with
the examined variables and consistent with excluded institutions, the demographics of
who is giving could be driving much of the disparities. The availability of data produced
a limited sample size and prohibits inclusion of these and other potentially correlated
factors. In addition, a single-year study runs the risk of not being reflective of all years,
nor of being an accurate representation of future years.
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Chapter 4: Findings and Conclusions
Chapter four presents the results of the analysis and begins with the purpose of the
study. Descriptive statistics for each research question are followed by results and
interpretation and discussion of findings. The chapter concludes by addressing limitations
and implications for future research.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to analyze precisely the direct and indirect impact of
personal income tax regulations on the charitable sector. It will do so by disaggregating
data to delineate clearly the differential consequences that distinguish higher education
from other components of the broad charitable sector umbrella. A fundamental premise
of this research is that systematic understanding of differences within the charitable
sector can lead to informed reconsideration of policy making. It also will assist colleges
and universities to make more informed decisions in terms of financial planning and
resource allocation.
My study is significant and timely because the measures reported in most
research, used by policy-makers and cited by the popular press, broadly relate to the
entire charitable industry as a whole. I argue that although this presentation is technically
accurate, it is incomplete and misleading because it lacks distinctions among categories
of institutions and groups within the charitable sector. However, my caution is that
numerous research studies have found tax-price elasticity variations dependent on
industry sector (Duquette, 2016; Feldstein, 1975; Yetman & Yetman, 2013). Clotfelter
(1990) found disparity in tax policy impact following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, with
only museums and higher education experiencing the predicted decline in giving. Cordes
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(2011) projected an assumed reduction in giving to estimate revenue impact by sector and
found variations as well.
In addition to these distinctions in impact, long-run outlooks on a reduction in
giving was lacking from discussions surrounding recent tax legislation, failing to fully
address the potential effect on not-for-profits reliant on endowments. Measuring the
impact of a resource flow change is short-sighted when limited to a single-year for
endowment giving. The consequences of a single-year loss, material or not, will be fully
realized over multiple years. Research is needed to address the unique structures of
endowments.
This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing debates about rising higher
education costs and accumulating endowment wealth by illuminating consequences to
take under consideration, provide evidence to support or refute the wisdom of proposed
tax policy, and inform future policy. Higher education administrators, endowment
managers, advocates, and policymakers should have interest in the results. The research
questions addressed in this study include:
1. What is the long-run financial impact of a tax policy proposal that changes the
tax price of giving on endowments of higher education institutions?
2. What institutional characteristics identify institutions with greater relevance to
personal income tax policies measured by higher reliance on individual giving
to university endowments?
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Research Question One
Descriptive Statistics
This section provides descriptive statistics for the first research question. All
presented monetary measures are inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollar values (U.S.
Department of Labor, 2019). Descriptive statistics of the unadjusted data are presented in
Tables A.5 through A.7 of the Appendix. Four categorical variables are used to analyze
the findings. Table 4.1 presents the frequency distribution for the time-invariant
categorical variable. Institutional control reflects a close to even split in the sample
between private and public institutions. The majority of the sample’s public institutions
are four-year colleges and universities. While it is possible for institutions to change the
control structure, as some two-year publics have expanded to four-year campuses, no
institutions in the sample made a control change in the observed period. Two-year public
institutions comprise a small portion of the sample. The sample distribution is not
reflective of the population of higher education institutions. Consistent with the sample,
IPEDS reports half of the U.S. institutions are private (NCES, 2019b). The remaining
half of the sample is heavily weighted with four-year publics whereas IPEDS reports
more two-year publics, 28% of the total population. While the sample distribution is not
in alignment with the higher education population holding endowments, the sample is in
alignment with higher education institutions that participated in the NACUBO Study of
Endowments and the NCSE. Chapter three of this dissertation provides a comparative
analysis of this dissertation’s sample and the NACUBO/NCSE samples. The remaining
categorical variables are presented in Tables 4.3, 4.9, and 4.10 and are quartiles based on
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size and contribution measures. Those are discussed alongside the relevant continuous
variables.
Table 4.1
Frequency Distribution of Time-Invariant Categorical Variable
Variable

Frequency (%)

Institutional Control
Private, not-for-profit

340 (52.5)

Public, 4-year

264 (40.7)

Public, 2-year

44 (6.8)

Descriptive statistics for the endowment size and contribution continuous
variables are presented in Tables 4.2 through 4.6. Table 4.2 presents inflation-adjusted
endowment ending FMVs. Endowment balances fluctuated throughout the observed tenyear period with the average and median highs in 2017 and lows in 2009. The fiscal years
run July to June and 2009 encompasses the economic downturn experienced in late 2008
and early 2009. Overall growth from the 2007 base year to 2017 was 17.5% for the
average and 22.5% for the median. Harvard University, a private institution, reported the
sample’s maximum balance in each year and Nashville State Community College, a twoyear public institution, reported the sample’s minimum balance in each year. The lowest
minimum and maximum balances for the ten-year period were observed in 2008 and
2009, respectively. The largest minimum balance was observed in 2017 and the largest
maximum balance was observed in 2008. Chapter one notes the steep decline in
alternative investment values during the Great Recession and the liquidity issues
subsequently created by alternatives. Harvard, notorious for being heavily invested in
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alternatives, represents the largest maximum balance of the sample and has yet to recover
to the FMV of 2008. As evident with the large standard deviations, the endowment sizes
are significantly dispersed throughout the observed period. Table 4.3 demonstrates the
variation with the introduction of a categorical variable derived from the ten-year average
endowment FMV, stated in 2017 dollars. Descriptive statistics for the ten-year average
FMV is provided by institutional control, revealing an association between institutional
control and endowment size. The derived categorical variable identifies the size quartile.
Figure 2 provides a visual representation of the dispersion of endowment sizes between
the three institutional control categories across the observed period. The bands in the bars
report the frequency counts of endowments by size quartile, with the darker band being
the smaller endowments. Private institutions in the sample hold a larger number of
quartile four endowments with the two-year publics being almost exclusively represented
in quartile one. Four-year public institutions had the greatest shift into higher quartiles
over the observed period. Seven entities moved from size quartile one and gains were
made in quartiles two (one additional institution), three (two additional institutions), and
four (four additional institutions). Two-year publics gained one spot in quartile two from
quartile one. Privates lost the net from quartiles two, three, and four with a shift of eight
into quartile one. Overall, however, the quartiles were relatively stable. Figure 3 provides
trendlines of the median endowment FMV from 2008 to 2017 by institutional control,
highlighting the dispersion of endowment wealth.
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Table 4.2
Descriptive Statistics for Actual Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, Adjusted for Inflation
to 2017 Dollar Value
Fiscal
Standard
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Year
Deviation
2008 616,504,701 86,115,511 2,416,164,000 248,617
40,611,295,200
2009 487,123,022 67,446,152 1,806,753,000 406,051
28,982,768,340
2010 521,571,837 74,672,725 1,906,730,000 434,915
30,206,488,480
2011 592,020,028 85,598,631 2,171,574,000 263,094
34,247,421,770
2012 578,589,452 84,692,054 2,116,745,000 270,515
32,252,686,860
2013 623,103,239 93,306,722 2,238,918,000 311,412
33,636,469,650
2014 705,626,051 101,623,160 2,520,126,000 376,381
36,623,419,540
2015 727,834,200 102,817,676 2,612,873,000 419,490
37,211,036,600
2016 702,310,826 103,688,427 2,520,968,000 438,258
34,903,590,120
2017 756,629,401 110,430,278 2,666,715,000 464,758
35,657,090,000
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Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV by Institutional Control and Ten-Year Average Actual
Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

631,131,276

91,460,713

2,292,214,000

363,349

34,433,226,656

Private, not-forprofit

867,408,502

136,703,207

2,986,581,000

2,370,906

34,433,226,656

Public, 4-year

430,517,433

71,230,582

1,118,618,000

1,364,549

9,356,463,460

Public, 2-year

9,035,761

7,072,694

8,376,000

363,349

39,921,680

Quartile 1

17,448,010

17,345,209

9,933,000

363,349

34,864,875

Quartile 2

59,262,418

57,170,420

16,036,000

35,014,049

91,420,513

Quartile 3

188,776,130

175,239,476

74,717,000

91,500,912

372,386,743

Quartile 4

2,259,038,545

863,549,903

4,187,780,000

376,622,256

34,433,226,656

All Institutions
Institutional Control
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2-yr Public
Private
4-yr Public
2-yr Public
Private
4-yr Public
2-yr Public
Private
4-yr Public
2-yr Public
Private
4-yr Public
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Private
4-yr Public
2-yr Public
Private
4-yr Public
2-yr Public
Private
4-yr Public
2-yr Public
Private
4-yr Public
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4-yr Public
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Figure 2. Frequency distributions of categorical variables. Quartiles are based on the
annual actual endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 2017 dollar value.
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Figure 3. Median actual endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to 2017 dollar value, by
institutional control.
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Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics for actual contributions to endowment,
inflation-adjusted to 2017 dollar values. The highest average was reported in 2017 and
the highest median in 2008. The lowest average was reported in 2010 and the lowest
median in 2009. Table 4.5 shows numerous institutions reported no endowment gifts in at
least one of the observed years and three institutions, two two-year publics and one fouryear public, reported no endowment contributions throughout the ten-year period. Of the
133 no-gift observations, only four were reported by private institutions. The remaining
no-gift observations were equally distributed between two- and four-year publics, even
though two-year publics represent only 6.8% of the sample. The largest total
contributions to endowments in each year was to private institutions – Cornell University
in 2009, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 2011, Stanford University in
2012, and Harvard University in all remaining years. Table 4.6 reflects the descriptive
statistics for the ten-year average contributions to endowment, inflation-adjusted to 2017
dollars. Much like endowment FMVs, the contributions and endowment size are
associated. The descriptive statistics by institutional control again demonstrate that twoyear publics are not, as a group, receiving an equal share of endowment donations. The
ten-year average contributions for privates and four-year publics, however, are more
closely aligned as compared to the difference in endowment size.
The remaining model variables are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. Return rates
reflect the oscillating economy experienced in the observed period, with significant losses
in 2009 and strong gains in 2011 and 2014. Fiscal year 2012 reported relatively flat
returns on investments, but some endowments experienced a slight gain while others
experienced a slight loss. Even with these fluctuations in returns, the spending rates were
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stable over the decade, hovering around 4%. As noted in chapter three, the annual rates of
return and spending are not available for specific institutions. Average rates as reported
by NACUBO/NCSE were applied according to endowment size and an annual
institutional measurement error was calculated to adjust for estimation variances.
Measurement error averaged 0.59% over the observed period, however the absolute
values averaged 4.91%. The largest measurement errors were observed in the 2009 and
2010 fiscal years data, volatile years of investment return, with one observation of
measurement error over 100% by Jacksonville University, a small private college. The
minimum and maximum measurement errors for each year were not dominated by an
individual institution or institutional control type. However, two-year publics were
overrepresented with one-third of the minimum and maximum measurement errors but
only 6.8% of the total sample. The measurement error corrects for both the return and
spending rates and, for this reason, prevents a more thorough evaluation of each variable
separately.
The combination of the return, spending, and measurement error rates reflect the
percentage change in endowment FMV, exclusive of contributions. Table 4.8 presents
descriptive statistics for the ten-year average of the combined rates. Unlike endowment
size and contributions, the combined return and spending rates are not significantly
varied based on institutional control or size quartile. Combined rates are slightly higher
and less varied for the largest endowment size quartile. The smallest endowment size
quartile reports the next highest average and median combined rates, but with greater
variation. The positive values of the average and median combined rates indicate that
more than half of the sample did not distribute funds greater than the return.
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Figure 4 presents a trendline of the annual average combined return and spending
percentage experienced. A second trendline represents the change in contributions, year
over year, for the observed period. The trendlines demonstrate that the year-over-year
change in average contributions moves in a pattern similar to the movement of the rate of
return and spending rate combined. The average spending rates remained stable
throughout the period, leading to an assumption that the change in contributions largely
follow the rate of return behavior. However, the measurement error is included in the
combined measure to correct for the variance between average rates and actual rates at
the institutional level and prevents a decoupling of the two variables for analysis
purposes.
Table 4.4
Descriptive Statistics for Actual Contributions to Endowment by Fiscal Year, Adjusted
for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value
Fiscal
Standard
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Year
Deviation
2008

12,331,332

2,750,464

32,533,000

–

333,605,440

2009

9,151,972

1,921,628

24,474,000

–

284,146,890

2010

9,124,032

2,067,406

22,801,000

–

269,688,160

2011

10,268,442

2,340,753

27,459,000

–

350,326,123

2012

9,915,952

2,123,507

29,708,000

–

437,840,643

2013

10,204,305

2,287,133

24,426,000

–

233,825,550

2014

12,565,258

2,455,561

35,889,000

–

528,238,590

2015

11,945,882

2,738,989

30,239,000

–

371,869,347

2016

12,002,399

2,193,974

32,469,000

–

498,574,665

2017

13,423,009

2,476,739

39,869,000

–

515,494,565
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Table 4.5
Frequency Distribution of No-Gifts-to-Endowment Observations by Institutional Control
and Fiscal Year
Institutional
Control

2008

2009

Private,
not-forprofit

2

1

0

0

8

7

8

6

5

8

Public, 4year
Public, 2year

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

0

0

0

0

0

1

6

7

6

7

7

7

7

6

4

5

5

4

8

8

Table 4.6
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Actual Contributions to Endowment by
Institutional Control and Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted
for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value
Standard
Variable
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
All
11,093,258
2,628,876
28,360,000
–
345,833,830
Institutions
Institutional
Control
Private,
not-forprofit
Public, 4year
Public, 2year

13,192,657

2,977,640

35,559,000

81,023 345,833,830

10,173,672

2,949,690

17,973,000

–

125,633,034

388,146

207,148

573,000

–

3,030,622

Quartile 1

746,075

599,842

612,000

–

3,363,174

Quartile 2

1,904,715

1,593,781

1,154,000

197,947

5,905,715

Quartile 3

4,934,280

4,237,416

3,104,000

576,444

18,845,292

Quartile 4

36,787,963

19,787,208

48,225,000

Endowment
Size
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2,143,032 345,833,830

Table 4.7
Descriptive Statistics for Rate of Return, Spending Rate, and Measurement Error by
Fiscal Year
Fiscal
Year

Return Rate
Mean
(Std.
dev.)

Min

2008

-0.030
(0.014)

2009

Spending Rate
Max

Mean
(Std.
dev.)

Min

-0.043

0.006

0.043
(0.002)

-0.186
(0.013)

-0.205

-0.168

2010

0.119
(0.002)

0.116

2011

0.191
(0.008)

2012

Measurement Error

Max

Mean
(Std.
dev.)

Min

Max

0.041

0.046

0.023
(0.097)

-0.758

0.887

0.043
(0.003)

0.039

0.049

0.015
(0.113)

-1.022

0.575

0.122

0.045
(0.007)

0.035

0.057

-0.006
(0.102)

-0.924

0.452

0.176

0.201

0.045
(0.006)

0.037

0.052

-0.013
(0.106)

-0.857

0.596

-0.003
(0.006)

-0.010

0.008

0.042
(0.004)

0.037

0.047

0.011
(0.074)

-0.631

0.374

2013

0.117
(0.002)

0.114

0.120

0.044
(0.002)

0.041

0.048

0.006
(0.070)

-0.547

0.633

2014

0.155
(0.004)

0.152

0.165

0.044
(0.001)

0.042

0.046

-0.004
(0.076)

-0.642

0.606

2015

0.024
(0.008)

0.019

0.043

0.042
(0.002)

0.040

0.045

0.012
(0.067)

-0.477

0.382

2016

-0.019
(0.005)

-0.024

-0.010

0.042
(0.002)

0.038

0.044

0.013
(0.056)

-0.262

0.289

2017

0.122
(0.005)

0.116

0.129

0.044
(0.002)

0.040

0.048

0.001
(0.068)

-0.410

0.957
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Table 4.8
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Combined Return, Spending, and
Measurement Error Rates by Institutional Control and Ten-Year Average Actual
Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

All
Institutions

0.0115

0.0102

0.0304

-0.1322

0.1619

0.0070

0.0061

0.0290

-0.1322

0.1159

0.0159

0.0142

0.0277

-0.0719

0.1274

0.0199

0.0179

0.0471

-0.0851

0.1619

Quartile 1

0.0127

0.0121

0.0379

-0.1322

0.1619

Quartile 2

0.0078

0.0056

0.0323

-0.0859

0.1274

Quartile 3

0.0092

0.0046

0.0265

-0.0772

0.0957

Quartile 4

0.0162

0.0143

0.0220

-0.0529

0.1095

Institutional
Control
Private, notfor-profit
Public,
4-year
Public,
2-year
Endowment
Size
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Figure 4. Endowment growth components, adjusted for inflation to 2017 dollar value, by
fiscal year.
The remaining categorical variables provide additional insights into endowment
characteristics that may cause dispersion in tax policy impact by contextualizing the size
and contribution variables. Extending the endowment size measure, the ten-year average
FMV is allocated to the FTE student enrollment, resulting in an endowment FMV per
student variable. Table 4.9 presents the descriptive statistics for this measure and the
categorical variable is based on the quartile. The data is skewed with a larger than
expected range. The minimum value, $64 per FTE, is reported by the sample’s smallest
endowment, Nashville State Community College. Seventeen of the twenty lowest FMV
per FTE institutions are two-year publics. A low-enrollment institution, University of
Texas Health Center at Tyler, represents the largest value. The institution enrolls graduate
students only and reported an average of five FTE students over the observed period. The
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2017

next largest FMV per FTE institution, University of Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center,
is not exclusively a graduate school but is lower-enrollment with an average of 270 FTE
students. The remaining seven institutions reporting FMV per FTE over $1,000,000
include the expected endowments: Princeton University, Yale University, Harvard
University, Stanford University, Swarthmore College, MIT, and Amherst College.
Sixteen of the twenty highest FMV per FTE institutions are private colleges and
universities. Endowment size quartiles fairly align with the FMV per FTE quartiles.
Relative contribution size quartiles reveal endowments with less reliance on contributions
have higher FMVs per FTE.
The final categorical variable is derived from a measure of contributions as a
portion of the endowment size. Gifts to endowment for the ten-year period, inflationadjusted to 2017 dollar value, were combined and calculated as a percentage of the 2017
endowment FMV. This is intended to be a proxy for the reliance on contributions to grow
the endowment. Table 4.10 presents the descriptive statistics for this measure and the
categorical variable is based on the quartile. As previously noted, three institutions
reported no contributions over the ten-year period of observation. Austin Peay State
University reported the highest value, 98.19%, with unusually large giving recorded in
2015 and 2016. Only two other entities, Chattanooga State Community College and
Trident Technical College, reported contributions of more than 75% of the 2017 FMV
and both hold relatively small endowments. Harvard University reported the highest
dollar value of contributions in seven of the ten observed years, but those contributions
reflect only 9.7% of the endowment’s 2017 FMV. Other large-gift universities report
similar percentages: Stanford University, 9.67% and MIT, 10.69%. The variable is
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associated with endowment size as larger endowments reflect lower percentages of
contributions based on endowment FMV. The variable descriptive statistics reflect this in
both of the endowment size quartile sets.
Table 4.9
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Average Actual FMV per Ten-year Average FTE
Student Enrollment by Quartile, Institutional Control, Ten-Year Average Actual
Endowment FMV Quartile, and Ten-Year Endowment Contributions as a Percentage of
2017 Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value
Standard
Variable
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
All Institutions

107,308

23,614

423,483

67

8,681,842

Quartile 1

2,922

2,886

1,468

67

5,690

Quartile 2

12,953

11,423

5,459

5,724

23,547

Quartile 3

41,027

38,632

12,754

23,735

69,990

Quartile 4

372,328

183,187

790,875

71,905

8,681,842

Private, not-for-profit

147,906

52,164

260,441

3,312

2,490,428

Public, 4-year

72,604

7,005

590,383

470

8,681,842

Public, 2-year

1,812

1,332

1,332

67

5,680

Quartile 1

9,096

3,517

38,594

67

489,301

Quartile 2

78,448

14,094

681,007

1,277

8,681,842

Quartile 3

68,199

46,699

72,083

2,882

398,805

Quartile 4

273,487

115,834

458,658

10,633

4,037,595

Endowment Size,
FMV per Student

Institutional Control

Endowment Size,
FMV
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Table 4.9 (Continued)
Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Quartile 1

286,602

59,122

810,589

678

8,681,842

Quartile 2

77,112

39,091

97,825

214

518,250

Quartile 3

40,524

17,993

73,716

244

589,320

Quartile 4

24,993

5,941

63,766

67

489,301

Variable
Relative Contribution
Size

Table 4.10
Descriptive Statistics for Ten-Year Endowment Contributions as a Percentage of 2017
Endowment FMV by Quartile, Institutional Control, Ten-Year Average Actual
Endowment FMV Quartile, and Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV per Ten-Year
Average FTE Student Enrollment Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation to 2017 Dollar Value
Standard
Variable
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
All Institutions

0.2492

0.2296

0.1413

–

0.9819

Quartile 1

0.0933

0.0978

0.0362

–

0.1451

Quartile 2

0.1858

0.1872

0.0235

0.1455

0.2310

Quartile 3

0.2779

0.2788

0.0271

0.2312

0.3311

Quartile 4

0.4454

0.4190

0.1032

0.3331

0.9819

Private, not-for-profit

0.2088

0.1862

0.1171

0.0176

0.7146

Public, 4-year

0.2904

0.2813

0.1412

–

0.9819

Public, 2-year

0.3139

0.3134

0.2072

–

0.8498

Relative Contribution
Size

Institutional Control
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Table 4.10 (Continued)
Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Quartile 1

0.3259

0.3100

0.1735

–

0.9819

Quartile 2

0.2631

0.2509

0.1274

0.0290

0.6305

Quartile 3

0.2268

0.1986

0.1185

0.0176

0.7146

Quartile 4

0.1808

0.1632

0.0925

0.0198

0.4580

Quartile 1

0.3325

0.3201

0.1681

–

0.9819

Quartile 2

0.2613

0.2546

0.1205

–

0.6160

Quartile 3

0.2385

0.2260

0.1250

0.0139

0.7146

Quartile 4

0.1643

0.1487

0.0859

0.0176

0.4281

Variable
Endowment Size,
FMV

Endowment Size,
FMV per Student

Results
The first research question of this study sought to quantify the long-run impact of
a consistent and sustained reduction in giving to endowments. To simulate the scenario,
historical results from a ten-year period, 2008 to 2017, were used both as a comparison
point and test dataset. The expected reduction in contributions from the recently enacted
TCJA was applied to the historical data, simulating the impact had the TCJA been
effective as of fiscal year 2008. Endowment asset values at the end of the ten-year period
were used to quantify the wealth impact of the reduced contributions resulting from the
tax policy.
Figure 5 depicts trendlines for both the actual and predicted average endowment
FMV from 2008 to 2017. The dips and peaks of the stock market and the overall growth
in endowment wealth is reflected. The variance is visible on the graph beginning in 2011
109

and grows throughout the remaining period. As noted in Table 4.11, in the first year the
variance between actual and predicted average endowment is 0.09% and increases an
average of 0.076% each year to a difference of 0.77% in the tenth year. Examining the
higher education sector as a whole, the difference of less than 1% after a decade is,
arguably, immaterial. The variance in actual and predicted endowment FMV fits the
linear equation !" = 0.01804 + 0.07611,. Using the linear equation, Table 4.12 projects
the variance for extended periods after the tax policy implementation. Twenty years postimplementation is projected to result in a variance of 1.54% and growing to 3.82% after
fifty years. The slow deterioration in endowment wealth allows an opportunity for higher
education to implement strategies to combat the loss in revenue. Subsectors are now
examined to determine if the impact is consistent throughout higher education or if select
institutions are predicted to experience different trends. Table 4.13 summarizes the
subsectors examined based on institutional control, endowment size, and relative
contribution size.
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Figure 5. Average actual and predicted ending endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end.
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Table 4.11
Actual and Predicted Average Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, Adjusted for Inflation to
2017 Dollar Value
Fiscal Year

Actual Mean

Predicted Mean

Variance

2008

616,504,701

615,940,346

0.0915%

2009

487,123,022

486,344,191

0.1599%

2010

521,571,837

520,292,353

0.2453%

2011

592,020,028

590,056,561

0.3317%

2012

578,589,452

576,269,756

0.4009%

2013

623,103,239

620,110,746

0.4803%

2014

705,626,051

701,665,712

0.5613%

2015

727,834,200

723,266,847

0.6275%

2016

702,310,826

697,432,908

0.6946%

2017

756,629,401

750,778,964

0.7732%

Table 4.12
Projected Variance of Actual to Predicted Endowment FMV by Years from Tax Policy
Implementation
Year

Variance

10
20
30

0.7732%
1.5402%
2.3013%
3.0624%
3.8235%

40
50
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Table 4.13
Actual and Predicted Average Endowment 2017 FMV by Institutional Control, Ten-Year
Average Actual Endowment FMV Quartile, Ten-Year Average Actual Endowment FMV
per Ten-Year Average FTE Student Quartile, and Ten-Year Average Endowment
Contributions as a Percentage of 2017 Endowment FMV Quartile, Adjusted for Inflation
to 2017 Dollar Value
Variable
All Institutions

Actual Mean

Predicted Mean

Variance

756,629,401

750,778,964

0.7732%

1,020,077,358

1,013,195,552

0.6746%

541,341,116

535,878,219

1.0091%

12,624,909

12,418,896

1.6318%

Quartile 1

22,795,284

22,418,382

1.6534%

Quartile 2

71,880,843

70,934,609

1.3164%

Quartile 3

224,153,899

221,668,647

1.1087%

Quartile 4

2,707,687,580

2,688,094,220

0.7236%

Quartile 1

42,295,210

41,548,910

1.7645%

Quartile 2

158,000,000

155,800,000

1.3924%

Quartile 3

462,200,000

457,000,000

1.1251%

Quartile 4

2,364,000,000

2,349,000,000

0.6345%

Quartile 1

1,851,330,175

1,842,170,366

0.4948%

Quartile 2

590,815,929

585,314,098

0.9312%

Quartile 3

464,945,501

458,557,957

1.3738%

Quartile 4

119,426,001

117,073,436

1.9699%

Institutional Control
Private, not-forprofit
Public, 4-year
Public, 2-year
Endowment Size,
FMV

Endowment Size,
FMV Per Student

Relative Contribution
Size
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Table 4.13 reports the tenth-year variance by categorical variables and Figures 6
through 9 present the ratio of predicted-to-actual average endowment FMVs with
trendlines. The base year, 2007, is included in the graphs to demonstrate an equal ratio
for the year prior to the simulated tax policy implementation. All the graphs illustrate a
continuing negative change year-over-year. Examining the reported variances by
institutional control in Table 4.13, public, two-year institutions are predicted to have the
greatest variance by 2017, 1.63%. Private institutions have the lowest variance with
0.68% and four-year publics are predicted to have a 1.01% variance by 2017. Figure 6
disaggregates the ten-year trendlines by institutional control. The 2017 predicted-toactual average endowment FMV ratio is 0.9923 for all institutions in the sample. Private
institutions are predicted to experience a gradually increasing variance that is relatively
smooth over the observed period. Four-year publics similarly reflect a gradual decline but
at a faster descent. Two-year publics are predicted to experience a much more drastic
decline over the decade.
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Figure 6. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end.
The variances are inversely related to endowment size, measured in both total
FMV and as FMV per full-time equivalent student enrollment. For total FMV, the largest
quartile has the lowest variance, 0.72%, and the smallest quartile has the highest
variance, 1.65%. The trendline results are disaggregated by the ten-year average
endowment FMV quartiles in Figure 7. Lower balance endowments are predicted to
experience the greatest variance in the predicted-to-actual ratio. Quartiles one and two
experience steady decreases, ending the decade with ratios of 0.9832 and 0.9865,
respectively. Quartile three experiences a less consistent decline with a slowdown in the
pace in years of economic downturn. The largest endowments, quartile four, is the least
volatile and has a ratio of 0.9924 at the end of 2017. Figure 8 presents the trendline
results by ten-year average endowment FMV per ten-year average student enrollment
with similar outcomes. Endowments with larger FMVs per student are predicted to
experience the least variance. Quartiles one, three, and four experience steady declines
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over the decade but quartile two is less consistent. The smallest endowment per student,
quartile one, end the predicted decade with a ratio of 0.9824.
Public two-year institutions are almost exclusively represented in the smallest
quartile of both endowment size measures. Figure 2 demonstrated the distribution of
endowment FMV quartiles by institutional control. The distribution for endowment FMV
per FTE is even more skewed between public and private entities. Quartile one is 96%
publics and quartile four is 90% privates. Institutions with large endowments, which
includes many private entities, are projected to have the ability to strategize against the
slow deterioration of the endowment wealth. Lower balance endowments, which includes
most public two-year institutions, are projected to experience an accelerated deterioration
with less reaction time.

1.000

0.995

0.990

0.985

0.980

0.975
2007

2008

2009
Quartile 1

2010

2011

2012

Quartile 2

2013

2014

Quartile 3

2015

2016

2017

Quartile 4

Figure 7. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end. Quartiles based on ten-year average actual FMV.

116

1.000

0.995

0.990

0.985

0.980

0.975
2007

2008

2009
Quartile 1

2010

2011

2012

Quartile 2

2013

2014

Quartile 3

2015

2016

2017

Quartile 4

Figure 8. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end. Quartiles based on ten-year average actual FMV
per ten-year average full-time equivalent enrollment.
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Endowments with greater relative contribution levels experience the highest
variance of any subsector examined. At the end of the tenth year, quartile four is
predicted to have a 1.97% variance as compared to 0.49% for quartile one. Trendlines for
contributions as a percentage of the endowment quartiles are depicted in Figure 9. The
simulated tax policy influences contributions and is expected to have the greatest impact
on endowments with higher reliance on giving, as compared to net return, to grow the
endowment. Figure 9 reveals that quartile one endowments, with low percentages of tenyears gifts as a percentage of 2017 endowment FMV, are projected to have a predictedto-actual ratio of 0.9951 in 2017. Quartile four endowments, with large gift-to-FMV
percentages, are predicted to have the lowest predicted-to-actual ratio of 0.9801.
Endowments with significant reliance on contributions for growth are projected to have
the shortest reaction time to the implemented tax policy.
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Figure 9. Ratio of predicted to actual average endowment FMV, adjusted for inflation to
2017 dollar value, by fiscal year-end. Quartiles based on total contributions to
endowment for 2008 to 2017 as a percentage of 2017 actual ending FMV.
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Research Question Two
Descriptive Statistics
This section provides descriptive statistics for the second research question. Table
4.14 displays the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of the full
sample for each continuous variable. The proportion of endowment contributions from
individuals average 66% and range from zero to 100%. Two entities reported no gifts
from individuals to the endowment. Kent State University in Ohio reported $50,000 in
endowment contributions in 2017, all from corporate gifts. Likewise, Leeward
Community College in Hawaii reported $10,000 in corporate gifts to the endowment and
no other contributions. Nine institutions, four of which are community colleges, reported
all endowment contributions were from individuals in 2017. As a point of interest, Yale
University reported 38% of endowment gifts from individuals and University of
Kentucky reported 68%.
Endowment size is measured by the FMV at the end of fiscal year 2017. The
variable is heavily skewed as evidenced by the difference in the mean and median, $667
million for the former and $109 million for the latter. The smallest endowment in the
sample with a reported FMV of $228,000 is held by Leeward Community College. Yale
University represents the largest endowment in the sample at $27 billion. The sample
includes 77 institutions with reported endowments over $1 billion and only three under
$1 million. The four smallest endowments all belong to community colleges.
Institution size measured by student enrollment, also skewed, ranges from 354
FTE students enrolled to over 60,000. Thirty-one entities in the sample report under
1,000 FTE students and all but one (Kauai Community College) are private institutions.
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By contrast, forty institutions report over 30,000 FTE students enrolled and only two
(University of Southern California and New York University) are privates. While not
included in the regression analysis, endowment FMV per FTE student enrollment also
clumps institutions by control at the tails. The 50 largest FMV-per-student endowments
belong to private colleges and universities. The 80 smallest belong to publics. The range
was $52 per student to $2.9 million per student; Princeton University is at the top with
Yale not far behind at $2.2 million per student.
The percentage of enrolled students awarded Pell Grant aid averaged 29% with a
standard deviation of 12%. The low end of the range is populated by expensive, private
institutions. Franklin W. Olin College of Engineering, a special focus college, and Elon
University report only 8% of students were awarded a Pell Grant in 2017. At the other
end of the range is Berea College, a well-known institution in endowment discussions.
The small, private college in Kentucky has one of the largest endowments (over $1
billion in 2017 and $704,000 per student) and primarily serves low-income students, as
evidenced by the reported 82% that received a Pell Grant in 2017.
Published tuition and fees variables reflect either the in-state or out-of-state rates
for public institutions. In-state rates display greater variance and out-of-state rates have a
higher mean and median. Thirty-four institutions publish in-state rates at or below $5,500
and 28 of those institutions are community colleges. Only two colleges in the sample
publish out-of-state rates below $5,500, but the lowest rates are still primarily held by
community colleges. Columbia University reports the highest published tuition and fees
for both the in-state and the out-of-state data. Columbia University is a private institution
and reports the same rate for in-state and out-of-state, but this highlights that no public
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institution surpasses that rate with the out-of-state rates. The highest published out-ofstate tuition and fees for a public institution is reported by University of Virginia at
$45,756, the 102nd highest rate in the sample. For in-state rates, College of William and
Mary has the highest published rate of public institutions at $21,234 and is the 322nd
highest of the full sample.
Table 4.14
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables, Full Sample
Standard
Variable
Mean
Median
Minimum
Deviation
Percentage of
Endowment
Contributions
66.095
69.218
22.436
–
from
Individuals

Maximum

100.000

Endowment
Size, FMV
(millions)

667.469

108.664

2,235.683

0.228

27,176.040

FTE Student
Enrollment
(000s)

9.511

4.836

10.715

0.354

60.310

Percentage
awarded Pell
Grants

29.310

28.000

12.258

8.000

82.000

Published
Tuition & Fees,
In-State (000s)

25.007

25.680

16.695

3.054

55.056

Published
Tuition & Fees,
Out-of-State
(000s)

30.787

30.802

12.452

5.060

55.056

121

The remaining variables are categorical and disaggregate the sample in Table
4.15. The variables denote if institutions are private and include a hospital, by Carnegie
Classification grouping. The overall private and public institutional control is fairly
evenly split, aligning with the higher education population noted in earlier sections of this
dissertation. The institutional control split is not even at the Carnegie Classification level,
with the exception of master’s universities. Baccalaureate institutions are primarily
private and doctoral institutions are primarily public. The sample includes only public
associate’s and private special focus four-year entities. The largest groups consist of
institutions that are classified as baccalaureate, master’s, and doctoral without a hospital,
over 87% of the sample. Only one institution includes a hospital without doctoral
classification and just below 6% of the sample have both.
Table 4.15
Frequency Distribution of Categorical Variables
Private,
Private,
Public,
Categories
With
No Hospital
No Hospital
Hospital
Associate’s

Public,
With
Hospital

Observations

–

–

35

–

35

Baccalaureate

159

–

16

–

175

Master’s

104

1

99

–

204

Doctoral

52

8

118

27

205

Special Focus
Four-Year

4

–

–

–

4

Observations

319

9

268

27

623
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Table 4.16 provides the median and interquartile ranges, preferred when skewness
is present, of the continuous variables for the full sample and the subcategories.
Descriptive statistics for percentage of endowment contributions from individuals are
fairly consistent across the subcategories with the exception of the somewhat lower
medians reported by doctoral institutions and those that include a hospital, which are
consistent with each other. Endowment size is much more varied, especially in the
significantly higher medians reported by doctoral institutions, special focus four-year
institutions, and those that include a hospital. The significantly lower median and range
for associate’s colleges is also noteworthy. Institution size measured by FTE student
enrollment is, again, higher for the doctoral and hospital inclusive institutions. Not
surprisingly, significant differences are noted between the private and public entities.
Percentage of students awarded a Pell Grant is more consistent across the subcategories,
with publics reporting the highest median and privates reporting the lowest median.
While representing the two smallest samples, the difference in medians and ranges of
associate’s colleges and special focus four-year institutions is alarming, but not
surprising. Tuition and fees reflect more consistency across the subcategories with out-ofstate rates in comparison to in-state. The greatest difference in medians and ranges is
reflected in institutional control and is reiterated based on the Carnegie Classification
groupings.

123

Table 4.16
Median and Interquartile Ranges of Continuous Variables by Categories
Published
Tuition &
Fees,
In-State
(000s)

Published
Tuition &
Fees,
Out-ofState
(000s)

28
(19-38)

25.7
(8.440.2)

30.8
(20.240.8)

2.4
(1.6-4.2)

23
(16-31)

39.6
(32.747.6)

39.6
(32.747.6)

73.82
(26.66304.54)

11.6
(6.0-22.9)

34
(26-41)

8.3
(6.910.6)

20.0
(17.125.4)

62.2
(48.5-68.5)

1,175
(592.52,745.5)

24.3
(16.233.3)

24
(18-34)

13.4
(9.427.8)

32.3
(26.341.4)

587

70.1
(51.2-85.2)

99
(41-318)

4.3
(2.1-10.9)

28
(20-38)

27.3
(8.340.3)

30.8
(19.740.8)

35

67.3
(52.6-89.0)

8
(5-22)

4.2
(2.1-6.4)

34
(28-39)

4.7
(3.9-5.4)

9.1
(8.212.2)

Baccalaureate

175

75.5
(56.5-87.6)

138
(53-377)

1.8
(1.2-2.3)

24
(17-35)

40.2
(31.648.8)

40.2
(31.648.8)

Master’s

204

76.2
(51.1-87.2)

56
(31-98)

4.8
(3.0-8.1)

31
(25-39)

20.6
(7.933.7)

24.8
(17.933.7)

Doctoral

205

61.4
(47.6-74.6)

476
(1531,259)

18.1
(10.226.1)

26
(18-36)

11.7
(8.738.5)

28.9
(22.540.8)

4

64.6
(38.2-78.0)

353
(268383.5)

2.4
(1.3-2.7)

13.5
(10.5-15)

47.7
(46.749.1)

47.7
(46.749.1)

N

Percentage of
Endowment
Contributions
from
Individuals

Full Sample

623

Private

Public

Endowment
Size, FMV
(millions)

FTE
Student
Enrollment
(000s)

Percentage

69.2
(50.7-84.5)

108.66
(43.88421.89)

4.8
(2.2-12.7)

328

72.5
(52.9-85.9)

156.10
(61.68504.25)

295

66.9
(48.3-81.7)

36

No Hospital

Associate’s

Variable

Hospital

Special Focus
Four-Year
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awarded
Pell
Grants

Results
Before considering a multivariate model for the percentage of endowment
contributions from individuals, each independent variable was tested in a bivariate
regression and tested for heteroskadasticity. Table 4.17 presents the results for each
independent variable. Five variables are not statistically significant in the bivariate model
and are eliminated for inclusion in the multivariate model. Issues were previously noted
with the in-state tuition and fees variable related to bimodal distribution and high
correlation with institutional control. While the out-of-state tuition and fees variable is
not bimodal, the variable still exhibits high correlation with the institutional control
variable. The institutional control, public or private, can be predicted with 91.7%
accuracy based on the in-state tuition and fees rate and with 73.9% accuracy based on
out-of-state rate.
The percentage of enrolled students awarded Pell Grants is also found to not be
statistically significant. Greater need-based aid was expected to negatively impact
individual giving to endowments. One case that serves as an example contradicting this
reasoning is Berea College with 98% of endowment giving originating from individuals
and 82% of enrolled students awarded Pell Grant aid in 2017. The indicator variables for
associate’s colleges and four-year special focus Institutions Carnegie Classifications are
not statistically significant and represent a small portion of the sample. Baccalaureate and
master’s indicators are positively correlated with percentage of endowment gifts from
individuals. The institutional control variable is positively correlated with percentage of
endowment gifts from individuals when indicating a private college or university. The
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remaining variables, indicator for doctoral institution, inclusion of a hospital, endowment
size, and student enrollment, are negatively correlated in the bivariate models.
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Table 4.17
Bivariate Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Percentage of Endowment Contributions from Individuals
Master’s

FourYear
Special
Focus

Endowment
Size
(Log)

Student
Enrollment
(Log)

Pell
Grants
(Log)

Tuition
& Fees,
In-State

Tuition &
Fees, Outof-State

Hospital

Doctoral

Associate’s

Intercept

63.377
(1.352)

66.545
(0.941)

68.997
(1.114)

66.032
(0.917)

64.447
(1.073)

64.974
(1.070)

66.147
(0.901)

75.150
(2.666)

72.989
(1.591)

58.502
(6.763)

64.263
(1.619)

66.623
(2.400)

Coefficient

5.163*
(1.797)

-7.791*
(2.451)

-8.820*
(1.817)

1.118
(4.448)

5.869*
(1.928)

3.424^
(1.955)

-8.077
(12.835)

-1.854*
(0.515)

-4.137*
(0.795)

2.311
(2.040)

0.073
(0.054)

-0.017
(0.072)

R2

0.013

0.016

0.034

0.000

0.014

0.005

0.000

0.021

0.042

0.002

0.003

0.000

Root MSE

22.305

22.380

22.067

22.453

22.298

22.396

22.445

22.223

21.981

22.431

22.421

22.453
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Private

Baccalaureate

Notes: ^Significant at 10%; †Significant at 5%; *Significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.

Table 4.18 provides the correlation matrix for the variables used in this study. As
expected, private institutional control is negatively correlated with the doctoral indicator,
master’s indicator, inclusion of a hospital indicator, and logarithm of student enrollment,
but positively correlated with the baccalaureate indicator and logarithm of endowment
size. Inclusion of a hospital is positively correlated with the doctoral indicator,
endowment size, and student enrollment. Endowment size is negatively correlated with
the master’s indicator. Both the logarithm of FTE student enrollment and the logarithm of
endowment FMV have high correlation with multiple variables. Higher endowment
FMVs tend to belong to doctoral institutions. Institutions with larger student enrollments
tend to be public universities and doctoral institutions. Economies of scale may be at play
as more tuition-paying students are needed to support the large-scale operations. State
appropriations, while no longer a major revenue source, may have historically been the
impetus for high enrollments either out of obligation or luxury.
Additional testing performed on the regression models indicate potential
concerns. The variance inflation factors indicate potential multicollinearity issues and the
correlation matrix of coefficients confirms concerns with the institutional control
indicator, logarithm of FTE student enrollment, and each of the Carnegie Classification
indicators. Six different regression models are considered and by dropping one or more
variables the multicollinearity issue may be alleviated. Increasing the sample size is not
an option due to lack of additional observation availability.

128

Table 4.18
Correlation Matrix for Observed Variables
Variables

Percentage of
Contributions,
Individuals

Private

Hospital

Doctoral

Baccalaureate

Master’s

Endowment
Size (Log)

1.000

Private

0.115

1.000

Hospital

-0.081

-0.137

1.000

Doctoral

-0.190

-0.328

0.339

1.000

Baccalaureate

0.118

0.478

-0.155

-0.438

1.000

Master’s

0.072

-0.017

-0.158

-0.489

-0.436

1.000

Endowment
Size (Log)

-0.143

0.222

0.322

0.517

0.001

-0.329

1.000

-0.204

-0.630

0.329

0.699

-0.656

-0.023

0.381
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Percentage of
Contributions,
Individuals

Student
Enrollment
(Log)

Student
Enrollment
(Log)

1.000

Using ordinary least squares regression, six models are considered to identify
characteristics of endowments with greater reliance on individual giving. The results of
the estimating equations are presented in Table 4.19. The first model uses the institutional
control and hospital indicators. Model two builds on the first model with the addition of
the endowment size measure. The third, fourth, and fifth models add the doctoral,
baccalaureate, and master’s indicator variables, respectively. The sixth model
incorporates the enrollment size measure. Independent variables were log-transformed to
address heteroscedasticity and residuals were inspected to check for the assumption of
normality of error terms.
The low R2s and lack of statistical significance demonstrate the lack of
explanation provided by any of the models. While model six results in the highest R2, all
independent variables lose statistical significance. The previously noted concerns with
multicollinearity are more likely to be alleviated with the more simplistic models. Model
three explains 4.7% of the variance in proportions of endowment gifts by individuals and
two variables, institutional control and logarithm of endowment FMV, are statistically
significant with 95% confidence. Model two explains a slightly lower 4.3% of the
variance and the same two variables are statistically significant but at the higher 99%
confidence. The variance inflation factors for each model do not indicate
multicollinearity issues, but the correlation matrix of coefficients for model three
reaffirms concerns with the doctoral classification indicator. For these reasons, model
two is the preferred model.
Model two estimates with 99% confidence that, on average, private institutions
have a 6.9% higher proportion of endowments gifts from individuals than public
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institutions, controlling for hospital inclusion and endowment size. Institutions with
hospitals, on average, have a 0.3% lower proportion of endowments gifts from
individuals than institutions without hospitals, controlling for institutional control and
endowment size. However, this estimate lacks statistical significance. The model
estimates with 99% confidence that endowment size, on average, decreases the
proportion of endowments gifts from individuals, controlling for institutional control and
hospital inclusion.
The preferred model was used to regress the dataset by subsamples of the
Carnegie Classification groupings: doctoral, master’s, baccalaureate, special focus fouryear, and associate’s colleges. The regression omitted variables because of collinearity
and the remaining variables lack statistical significance with the associate’s colleges
sample and the special focus universities sample. The regression of the baccalaureate
sample omitted the hospital indicator, but the endowment size variable is statistically
significant with 99% confidence that the logarithm of the endowment FMV is negatively
correlated with the proportion of endowment gifts from individuals. All variables lose
statistical significance with the doctoral sample. The master’s sample estimates, with
99% confidence, that inclusion of a hospital increases, on average, the proportion of
endowment gifts from individuals by 15.6% when controlling for institutional control and
endowment size. The regression results for each of the subsamples are available upon
request.
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Table 4.19
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Percentage of Endowment Contributions from Individuals
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Private

4.753*
(1.828)

6.899*
(1.832)

5.269†
(2.150)

4.719†
(2.262)

4.497^
(2.301)

1.964
(3.180)

Hospital

-6.396†
(2.513)

-0.311
(2.897)

0.380
(2.897)

0.467
(2.907)

0.588
(2.904)

0.857
(2.921)

-2.282*
(0.609)

-1.663†
(0.761)

-1.740†
(0.766)

-1.861†
(0.752)

-1.334
(0.930)

-3.881
(2.671)

-3.114
(2.862)

-0.041
(4.883)

1.836
(5.311)

1.977
(2.391)

5.053
(4.800)

4.100
(4.757)

3.386
(4.566)

4.399
(4.748)

Endowment Size
(Log)
Doctoral
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Baccalaureate
Master’s
Student
Enrollment (Log)

-2.254
(2.032)
63.962
(1.432)

73.628
(3.195)

72.699
(3.286)

72.549
(3.291)

70.267
(4.840)

72.084
(4.739)

R2

0.018

0.043

0.047

0.048

0.049

0.051

Root MSE

22.274

22.000

21.978

21.984

21.989

21.981

Intercept

Notes: ^Significant at 10%; †Significant at 5%; *Significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are provided in
parentheses.

Interpretation and Discussion of Findings
Examining the impact to the endowment wealth base, the erosion is not material
for the overall higher education sector. Endowments with greater relative contribution
levels experience the largest erosion of any subsector examined. Individual institutions,
however, will experience various levels of erosion. Nevertheless, the institution with the
sample’s greatest predicted erosion would experience less than 4% of variation in the
endowment base after a decade of reduced giving. Even though sustained loss of
contributions to endowments for any reason will result in wealth erosion, this study’s
context was a tax policy that increased the tax price of giving for individual taxpayers.
Identification of institutional sectors or characteristics with greater reliance on
endowment contributions from individual taxpayers and, therefore, at greater risk for
significant levels of erosion, provides limited insights. The regression results indicate
private institutions and institutions with smaller endowments measured by FMV are
correlated with larger proportions of endowment gifts from contributions by individuals.
The erosion of overall endowment wealth is gradual, with each thirteen-year
period adding a percentage of predicated variance impact. Subsectors of higher education
are predicted to experience different rates of attrition. The variances are greater for twoyear publics, endowments with relatively small FMVs, and endowments with greater
reliance on contributions to build the base over the observed decade. Two extreme cases
highlight the individual endowment experiences. Trident Technical College (Trident) is a
two-year public institution in Charleston, South Carolina. Trident’s endowment had FMV
average of $2.15 million over the observed decade, $2.67 million at the end of 2017, and
$224 endowment FMV per student – a relatively small endowment for the higher
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education sector. Contributions over the ten-year period accounted for 76% of the 2017
FMV, indicating a high reliance on gifts to build endowment wealth. Trident distributed
more than the investment return based on the ten-year average combined rates of -2.6%.
The prediction model estimates Trident’s endowment base will be 3.47% lower a decade
post-implementation of the TCJA, over four times more than overall higher education
endowments. Grinnell College, a private not-for-profit institution in Iowa, is predicted to
have much less of an impact on endowment wealth. Grinnell’s endowment is relatively
large with a ten-year average of $1.6 billion FMV, $1.87 billion at the end of 2017, and
$979,389 endowment FMV per student. Contributions over the previous decade
accounted for less than 2% of the FMV and the ten-year average combined rates of return
and spending is 1.3%, indicating return exceeded disbursements. The prediction model
estimates Grinnell’s endowment base will be 0.11% lower following ten years of TCJA.
Two median institutions demonstrate how different profiles can result in similar
experiences. State University of New York College of Technology at Canton (Canton)
and University of Alabama (UA) are both four-year public entities that are predicted to
have 1.18% lower endowment base ten years after the implementation of the TCJA. UA
has a larger endowment, $824 million in 2017 and $24,216 per student as compared to
Canton’s $12 million endowment and $3,526 per student. Contributions over the previous
decade accounted for 25% of UA’s endowment and 26% of Canton’s endowment FMV
at the end of 2017. UA, however, has an average combined return and spending rate of
2.22% while Canton’s average is -2.02%. UA built wealth over the decade by not
disbursing more than return but Canton disbursed more than the return. The individual
cases illuminate endowments will vary in levels of concern and reactions.
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Early endowment theory views these entities as financial buffers or precautionary
savings vehicles (Fisman & Hubbard, 2003; Hansmann, 1990; Helms et al., 2005). More
recent research on operating behavior disputes the savings theory. Brown et al. (2010)
found universities responded to the financial shock of the burst technology bubble by
reducing operating expenses and cutting endowment payout rates. The Center for Social
Philanthropy Tellus Institute (2011) documented canceled projects and loss of jobs in
response to the Great Recession. The TCJA is expected to decrease all contributions and
may be viewed as a financial shock requiring strategic shifting. While Dahiya and
Yermack (2018) note many endowments are building purchasing power by maintaining
long-run spending rates below return rates, current endowment managers may be tempted
to reduce the distributions to further protect endowment wealth instead of increasing the
payout rate as a buttress for the operations dependent on endowment support. Cejnek et
al. (2017) found a substitution effect between donations and returns. A reduction in
giving can be counterbalanced by an increase in return. Loss of contributions to the
university, not just the endowment, may lead to higher-risk investment strategies to strive
for greater return to compensate. Overall, higher education endowments underperform
market benchmarks, but selective schools have stronger performance (Dahiya &
Yermack, 2018; Lerner et al., 2008). Less-selective schools and smaller endowments, in
an attempt to mimic the more successful endowments, may damage their own
endowments even further by engaging in high-risk investment practices.
Consistent, sustained loss of contributions in the range of 4.5% may not be
viewed as a financial shock to higher education endowments. If the loss of contributions
does not warrant immediate action or strategic movements, the distributions will
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inevitably decline as a result of the customary payout model. NACUBO (2019a) notes the
archetype distribution model is a defined percentage of a moving average of the
endowment’s FMV. Without growth of the base the distribution growth will be limited to
the rise in the market valuations. Hansmann (1990) opines this model violates the notion
of a financial buffer for university operations as the model protects the endowment base
more than the distribution stream. Cejnek et al. (2017) found smaller endowments
endeavor to accumulate endowment wealth with lower or no payout rates. This study
found smaller endowments are also more reliant on contributions to accumulate wealth.
Those endowments may not discern the loss of contributions through the disbursement
stream, but through the extension of time to accumulate endowment wealth. In many
cases, no reaction to the decline in endowment giving will lead to a subtle decline in the
base with a delayed decline in the distribution stream. These subtle declines could be
further masked in a robust economy experiencing strong returns. The reality is, however,
the loss in contributions will continue to erode the endowment wealth.
This study also strives to contribute insights about institutional and endowment
characteristics related to greater reliance on individual giving to endowments. The results
are suggestive but inconclusive. Bivariate regression indicates several variables are
correlated with reliance on individual giving to endowments, however multicollinearity
concerns cast uncertainty on the results. The goal was not to determine causality but to
identify characteristic patterns indicative of larger proportions of endowment gifts from
contributions by individuals. The multivariate regression results point toward private
institutions, institutions without hospitals, and endowments that are smaller when
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measured by FMV. However, only the institutional control and endowment size variables
are statistically significant in the preferred model.
Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) found endowment wealth per student positively
correlated with giving from all sources and a greater share of annual giving directed
towards building the endowment. Their findings, however, are not necessarily indictive
of a difference in proportions of giving by source. If all sources are giving more at a
similar rate, there is little to no change in the allocation by source. The inconclusive
results are a reminder that all endowed institutions need to have a heightened awareness
of both direct and indirect tax policy implications on contributions to endowments. All
endowments should be evaluating reliance on individual giving, realizing that reaction
time to individual tax policy is shortened with greater reliance.
Limitations and Future Research
Limitations identified in the previous chapter are now restated within a
framework of potential future research. The first limitation raised relates to the use of
historical data to predict future outcomes without controlling for other factors including
decision-altering behaviors. During this study the tax overhaul assumed, based on the
TCJA, has been implemented and the first year of contribution data is being collected.
Early reports indicate the loss of contributions is not as extreme as expected for 2018.
Giving USA (2019) reports an inflation-adjusted decrease of 1.7% overall, but a decrease
of 3.7% for the all-inclusive education sector. At this time, it is unknown if charitable
entities were proactive in combating the expected loss of gifts. There is evidence that
taxpayers altered behaviors to maximize tax benefits through the use of DAFs and
bunching (contributing multiple years’ worth of gifts in a single year to qualify for
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itemization with no or low gifting in the subsequent year or years). With the sweeping
changes in individual tax policy, filers may not have been aware or fully informed of
their personal change in tax benefits at the time of making donation decisions for tax year
2018. Tax year 2019 may be more reflective of donation decisions responding to the
TCJA. Once sufficient data is available, research can begin to test the tax-price elasticity
assumptions used in this study and the microsimulations that informed parties interested
in the predicted impact on contributions as a result of the TCJA. Much like the study
conducted by Clotfelter (1990) following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, an examination of
actual outcomes will provide informative research into the strength of tax-price of giving
elasticity theory.
Tax-price of giving elasticity assumptions, as noted in the literature review, are
imprecise and applied in a highly aggregated manner. The generally-accepted elasticity is
being applied to a very specific type of giver that may differ from the population, to a
specific sector that may differ from the overall not-for-profit industry, and to a specific
type of contribution vehicle that operates uniquely. At the most basic level, this study’s
treatment of all endowment contributions as gifts from donors subjected to individual
income tax regulations may misrepresent the predicted decrease in annual contribution
revenue. While the second research question attempted to address this limitation, the low
sample size and inconclusive results failed to mitigate the concern.
Each sample fails to accurately represent the full population of higher education
institutions reporting endowments and may bias the results. The first research question
finding that erosion variances are greater for two-year publics and endowments with
relatively small FMVs highlights that my results may underestimate the impact to the
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higher education sector as a whole as those are the institutions not fully represented in the
sample. The inconclusive findings of the second research question may also be driven by
the lack of a sufficiently large and diverse sample. The results do, however, provide a
baseline analysis to allow further research on the proportions of endowment giving by
source trends. Changes in the giving source demographics, and the impetus and
motivations for those changes, should be of interest to advancement units in higher
education and other sectors with reliance on endowment assets.
The broader limitation of the tax-price elasticity assumption identified previous
research on elasticity by different types of donors, gifts, and charitable causes is limited,
contradictory, or inconclusive. In light of the trendlines displayed in Figure 4, giving to
endowments may have weaker tax-price elasticity and stronger income elasticity. There
are several characteristics of endowment giving that may negate the otherwise-observed
elasticity: perpetuity of gift (viewed more as an investment than a donation), status
confirmation (with publication of gifts or naming rights), gift size, gift form (revenuegenerating assets, including investments and businesses with values dependent on the
economic environment), and longevity of gifting period (pledges allocated over multiple
years). With the recently revised tax regulatory environment, changes in donor behaviors
provide opportunities to analyze tax-price of giving elasticity theory with greater
precision. While the elasticity-defining limitation is concerning in the context of tax
policy as the cause of endowment wealth erosion, this study’s findings are applicable to
any sustained loss in charitable contributions to endowments.
A provision in the TCJA not addressed in this study is a net investment income
excise tax imposed on select institutions. Endowment investments and other non-
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charitable use assets of private colleges and universities with at least 500 tuition-paying
FTE students and endowment assets of at least $500,000 per student are subject to the
1.4% excise tax (U.S. House, 2017). The financial parameters for eligible institutions are
not inflation-adjusted and while few colleges and universities are subject to the tax at
enactment date, the number of entities effected is expected to increase over time. The
excise tax was not included in this study as the policy does not alter individual donors’
incentives to give and is initially applicable for so few institutions. The implications of
the tax on endowments and higher education finances is an area for future research.
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Appendix
Table A.1
Frequency Distribution of Institutions by Carnegie Classification Groupings, 2017
IPEDS
Carnegie
IPEDS
Reporting
NCSE
VSE
Classification Frequency Endowments Frequency Frequency
2015: Basic
(%)
Frequency
(%)
(%)
(%)
Associate’s
1,057
688 (25.8)
27 (3.3) 120 (12.8)
and Two(27.3)
Year
Baccalaureate 583 (15.0)
501 (18.8) 202 (25.0) 227 (24.1)
Master’s

679 (17.5)

647 (24.3) 243 (30.0) 304 (32.3)

Doctoral

312 (8.0)

307 (11.5) 304 (37.6) 250 (26.6)

Special Focus 614 (15.8)
Four-Year
Tribal
34 (0.9)
Colleges
Not
599 (15.5)
Accredited or
NondegreeGranting
Total

3,878

425 (16.0)

33 (4.1)

38 (4.0)

26 (1.0)

–

2 (0.2)

70 (2.6)

–

–

2,664

809

941
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Table A.2
Frequency Distributions of Institutions Reporting Endowments by Carnegie
Classification Groupings, 2017
RQ1
RQ2
Carnegie
IPEDS
NCSE
VSE
Sample
Sample
Classification Frequency Frequency Frequency
Frequency Frequency
2015: Basic
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Associate’s
and
688 (25.8)
27 (3.3) 120 (12.8)
50 (7.7)
35 (5.6)
Two-Year
Baccalaureate 501 (18.8) 202 (25.0) 227 (24.1) 168 (25.9) 175 (28.1)
Master’s

647 (24.3) 243 (30.0) 304 (32.3) 204 (31.5) 204 (32.7)

Doctoral

307 (11.5) 304 (37.6) 250 (26.6) 200 (30.9) 205 (32.9)

Special Focus
425 (16.0)
Four-Year
Tribal
Colleges
Not
Accredited or
NondegreeGranting
Total

33 (4.1)

38 (4.0)

26 (4.0)

4 (0.7)

26 (1.0)

–

2 (0.2)

–

–

70 (2.6)

–

–

–

–

2,664

809

941

648

623

Table A.3
Frequency Distributions of Institutions Reporting Endowments by Institutional Control,
2017
RQ1
RQ2
IPEDS
NCSE
VSE
Institutional
Sample
Sample
Frequency Frequency Frequency
Control
Frequency Frequency
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
1,355
Private
507 (62.7) 455 (48.4) 340 (52.5) 328 (52.6)
(50.9)
1,309
Public
302 (37.3) 486 (51.6) 308 (47.5) 295 (47.4)
(49.1)
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Table A.4
Endowment FMV Medians of Institutions Reporting Endowments by Institutional
Control, 2017
RQ1
RQ2
Institutional
IPEDS
NCSE
VSE
Sample
Sample
Control
Median
Median
Median
Median
Median
($ in
Endowment Endowment Endowment
Endowment Endowment
millions)
FMV
FMV
FMV
FMV
FMV
Private

$33

$136

$119

$161

$156

Public

$9

$106

$47

$71

$74

Table A.5
Fiscal
Year

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

2008

550,450,626

76,888,849

2,157,289,000

221,979

36,260,085,000

2009

427,300,897

59,163,292

1,584,871,000

356,185

25,423,481,000

2010

465,689,140

66,672,076

1,702,437,000

388,317

26,970,079,000

2011

543,137,640

78,530,855

1,992,270,000

241,371

31,419,653,000

2012

540,737,805

79,151,453

1,978,266,000

252,818

30,142,698,000

2013

593,431,656

88,863,545

2,132,302,000

296,583

32,034,733,000

2014

685,073,836

98,663,262

2,446,724,000

365,418

35,556,718,000

2015

706,635,146

99,822,987

2,536,770,000

407,272

36,127,220,000

2016

688,540,026 101,655,321 2,471,537,000

429,665

34,219,206,000

2017

756,629,401 110,430,278 2,666,715,000

464,758

35,657,090,000

Descriptive Statistics for Actual Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, unadjusted for
inflation
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Table A.6
Descriptive Statistics for Actual Contributions to Endowment by Fiscal Year, unadjusted
for inflation
Standard
Fiscal Year
Mean
Median
Minimum Maximum
Deviation
2008

11,010,118

2,455,772

29,047,000

2009

8,028,046

1,685,639

21,468,000

2010

8,146,457

1,845,899

20,358,000

–

240,793,000

2011

9,420,589

2,147,480

25,192,000

–

321,400,113

2012

9,267,245

1,984,586

27,764,000

–

409,196,863

2013

9,718,385

2,178,222

23,263,000

–

222,691,000

2014

12,199,280

2,384,040

34,844,000

–

512,853,000

2015

11,597,944

2,659,213

29,358,000

–

361,038,201

2016

11,767,057

2,150,955

31,832,000

–

488,798,691

2017

13,423,009

2,476,739

39,869,000

–

515,494,565
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–

297,862,000
–

249,251,658

Table A.7
Descriptive Statistics for Predicted Endowment FMV by Fiscal Year, unadjusted for
inflation
Fiscal
Standard
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Year
Deviation
2008

549,946,738

76,688,991

2,156,144,000

221,489

36,245,429,709

2009

426,617,711

58,866,312

1,583,415,000

354,499

25,406,539,853

2010

464,546,744

66,283,099

1,699,974,000

386,095

26,940,229,988

2011

541,336,295

78,249,462

1,988,307,000

239,852

31,373,518,950

2012

538,569,866

78,512,555

1,973,274,000

249,990

30,088,587,996

2013

590,581,663

88,298,196

2,125,925,000

289,813

31,966,568,442

2014

681,228,847

98,064,463

2,437,927,000

355,533

35,455,900,268

2015

702,200,822

98,618,257

2,526,558,000

395,833

36,008,792,088

2016

683,757,753

99,692,180

2,460,369,000

417,435

34,087,109,080

2017

750,778,964 109,457,492 2,652,988,000

451,530

35,496,591,374
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